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I. Introduction
Imagine walking through a forest one afternoon in 1974. You come
across a large cave and your curiosity coerces you to enter. As you walk
through the cave, you realize that it contains a series of passageways and
tunnels. Confident you will be able to find your way back, you decide to
explore. In only a matter of minutes, however, you completely lose your
way. For eleven years, you wander through the tunnels, but your efforts to
get out seem hopeless. Finally, in 1985, you discover a map that appears to
outline the entire tunnel system. Although the map helps you navigate the
tunnels, you occasionally find tunnels that do not appear on the map. Each
time you encounter a new tunnel, you draw it on the map. After several
years, you have drawn so many new tunnels that your map has become
illegible and your hopes dwindle.
In 2003, you make a startling discovery-you find a new map. You
are convinced that this map, which is simpler and less confusing than the
old one, will end your confusion and lead you out of the labyrinth. In order
to succeed, however, you must be careful to make sure you correctly
interpret the map as the drafter intended. If not, the confusion of the
labyrinth will continue and you will remain lost without hope.
This Note will explain why the above situation is similar to the
problem that lower courts face when trying to analyze the Insurance
Savings Clause of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).
The Insurance Savings Clause is an exception to ERISA preemption that
"saves" state laws dealing with insurance from preemption. Since ERISA's
passage in 1974, courts have been lost trying to interpret the meaning and
scope of this clause.
This Note proceeds in four stages. Part II provides a brief background
on general ERISA preemption and the purposes of the Insurance Savings
Clause.' Part III introduces Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v.
2Massachusetts, which outlines the Supreme Court's original map for
1. See infra Part II (explaining the purposes of ERISA preemption and why the
Insurance Savings Clause was necessary).
2. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724 (1985). In Metropolitan Life, the
Supreme Court considered whether two employee benefit insurers (Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co. and Travelers Insurance Co.) had to comply with a Massachusetts law that required all
health insurance policies to include coverage for mental health. Id. at 727. The two insurers
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Insurance Savings Clause analysis.3 This Part then analyzes how courts
applied the original map following the Metropolitan Life decision in 1985. 4
Two years after Metropolitan Life, in Pilot Life Insurance Co. v.
Dedeaux, 5 the Court tried to define the boundaries of the map to make the
analysis easier; however, this confused lower courts more than it helped.6
Pilot Life will be discussed in Part 111. 7 To clear up the confusion in the
lower courts, the Supreme Court tried to simplify the map in 1999 and
2002 in UNUM Life Insurance Co. of America v. Ward8 and Rush
argued that they did not have to comply with the Massachusetts law because ERISA preemption
applied. Id. at 732-33. Massachusetts passed the mental health law to allow the mentally ill to
be able to purchase affordable insurance. Id. at 731. Because the Massachusetts law restricted
the type of insurance policies that a benefit plan could purchase and therefore related to
employee benefit plans, the insurers argued that ERISA preempted the state law. Id. at 732-33.
Massachusetts, however, argued that because the law regulated insurance, the Insurance Savings
Clause saved it from preemption. Id. at 738. The Supreme Court decided that the mandated-
benefit laws regulated insurance and ERISA preemption did not apply. Id. at 746-47.
3. Id. at 739-40 (setting forth a two-step analysis to determine when the Insurance
Savings Clause should save a state law from ERISA preemption).
4. See infra Part III (tracing the development and application of the original map).
5. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987). In Pilot Life, the Supreme Court
decided whether ERISA preempted the common law tort and contract actions of a worker that
claimed bad faith against his employer's insurer. Id. at 43. The worker was collecting
permanent disability benefits from a long-term disability employee benefit plan after sustaining
a job-related injury. Id. The insurance company terminated the benefits after two years, then
reinstated them, but then terminated and reinstated them several more times during the next
three years. Id. The employee asserted common law breach of contract and tort claims against
the insurance company under Mississippi law, but the insurance company argued that ERISA
preempted all of the claims. Id. at 43-45. The Supreme Court decided that ERISA did preempt
any common law breach of contract or tort claims that asserted improper handling of a disability
claim under an employee benefit plan. Id. at 57. Thus, the Insurance Savings Clause did not
save the employee's claim from ERISA preemption. Id.
6. See Donald T. Bogan, ERISA: The Savings Clause, § 502 Implied Preemption,
Complete Preemption, and State Law Remedies, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 105,124-30(2001)
(explaining that Pilot Life limited the test set forth in Metropolitan Life by applying a narrower
reading of the Insurance Savings Clause).
7. Infra Part m.B-C.
8. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358 (1999). In Ward, the Supreme
Court clarified the Insurance Savings Clause analysis that had been set forth in Metropolitan
Life and modified in Pilot Life. Id. at 373. An employee filed a permanent disability claim with
his employer's insurer, but the claim was filed five months past the fifteen-month window set
forth in the insurance contract. Id. at 364-66. The employee filed suit under California's
notice-prejudice rule, which excuses an insured's failure to file a timely claim unless the
insurance company can prove that it suffered prejudice because of the delay. Id. at 366-67.
The district court ruled that the Insurance Savings Clause did not save the notice-prejudice rule
from ERISA preemption, but the Ninth Circuit reversed. Id. at 365-66. By focusing on the
common-sense analysis under the Insurance Savings Clause and holding that satisfaction of all
three McCarran-Ferguson factors was not required for a law to be saved, the Supreme Court
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Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran9 respectively, both of which will be
explained in Part 111.10
The Supreme Court's effort to alleviate the confusion of the old map proved
unsuccessful, which caused the Court to throw the map away and create a new map in
Kentucky Association of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller." 1 Part IV of the Note examines
the new map in detail.12 Part V then explains that if lower courts correctly follow the
new test, they may be able to alleviate the confusion that has existed in interpreting the
Insurance Savings Clause for the past thirty years.' 3 This Note, however, will assert
that lower courts are not following the map as its cartographers intended.' 4 It will
explain that for the new map to be productive, courts must first recognize that it is
different from the old map.1 5 This Note also will argue in Part V that courts must
realize that the new map was intended to make the Insurance Savings Clause stronger
than it had been post-Pilot Life.16 Part V will stress that if lower courts do not
recognize that the new map is different than the old map and that it was intended to
agreed with the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 373-79.
9. Rush Prudential, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002). In Rush Prudential, the
Supreme Court considered whether ERISA preempted a section of the Illinois HMO Act. Id. at
359. An employee's spouse filed a claim against her husband's employer's insurer to pay for
surgery on her shoulder. Id. at 360. Rush, the insurer, decided that the claim was not
"medically necessary," and pursuant to the insurance contract with Moran's husband's
employer, Rush denied the claim, and Moran filed suit under the state act. Id. at 360-62. The
district court ruled that ERISA preempted Moran's claim, but the Seventh Circuit reversed on
Insurance Savings Clause grounds. Id. at 363-64. The Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh
Circuit and decided that the Insurance Savings Clause saved the Illinois HMO Act from ERISA
preemption. Id. at 387. The Court also rejected an implied preemption argument that ERISA
preempted the Illinois HMO Act because it provided for a remedy not authorized by ERISA's
civil enforcement provisions. Id. at 375-87.
10. Infra Part III.D.
11. Ky. Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 123 S. Ct. 1471 (2003). In Miller, the Court
had to decide whether ERISA preempted two of Kentucky's Any Willing Provider statutes. Id.
at 1474. The district court and the Sixth Circuit ruled that the Insurance Savings Clause saved
both laws from preemption because they regulated the business of insurance. Id. at 1474-75.
The Supreme Court affirmed this ruling, but removed consideration of the McCarran-Ferguson
factors from the Insurance Savings Clause analysis. Id. at 1478-79. The Court held that the
Insurance Savings Clause saved both laws because they were specifically directed at the
insurance industry and they substantially affected the risk-pooling arrangement between the
insurer and the insured. Id. at 1479.
12. Infra Part IV.
13. See infra Part V (asserting that properly interpreting the map in the way the Supreme
Court intended will clear up the Insurance Savings Clause analysis).
14. See infra Part V (noting that the lower courts are misapplying the Miller map).
15. See infra Part V (explaining the differences between the new Miller map and the
original map set forth in Metropolitan Life).
16. See infra Part V (contending that the Insurance Savings Clause will apply to save
more state laws under the new map than it did under the original map).
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make the Insurance Savings Clause stronger, then confusion will continue in Insurance
Savings Clause analysis and lower courts will remain lost.17 Finally, this Note
will provide lower courts with a compass to help them interpret and follow the
map provided by the Supreme Court's decision in Miller. 
18
II. Background
When Congress passed ERISA in 1974, the Act was intended to protect
pension benefits for employees uniformly across the country. 19 In order to
facilitate this purpose, Congress designed ERISA to preempt state laws
governing employee benefits. 20 The Preemption Clause preempted "any and all
State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit
plan.",2' This clause was much stronger than it had been in original drafts of
ERISA.22 Congress created a broader clause because it believed that a weaker
clause would lead to "endless litigation., 23 The new clause, however, did not
achieve this objective, for ERISA preemption has been one of the most litigated
legal areas of the past thirty years.24 In addition to perplexing litigants, the
broad standard also has confused the courts that must apply it.
25
17. Infra Part V.
18. See infra Part V (observing that the Insurance Savings Clause analysis will be cleared
up if lower courts will follow the Supreme Court's lead).
19. See 120 CONG. REc. S29,942 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974) (outlining the purposes of
ERISA).
20. See Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 522-23 (1981) (finding
ERISA's preemption provision to be an announcement of congressional intent to make the
regulation of employee benefit plans to be exclusively a federal concern).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000).
22. See Jay Conison, ERISA and the Language of Preemption, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 619,619
(1994) (suggesting that prior to being submitted to the conference committee, ERISA preempted
state laws only insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to the fiduciary, reporting, and
disclosure responsibilities of persons acting on behalf of employee benefit plans or insofar as
they may now or hereafter relate to the subject matters regulated by this Act (quoting H.R. 2,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. 114 (1973), reprinted in I SENATE COMM. ON LABOR& PUBLIC WELFARE,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974, at 51
(1976))).
23. See id. at 620 (setting forth statement of New York Senator Jacob Javits explaining
the reasons that the conference committee altered the preemption clause).
24. A simple LEXIS search of any case law involving "ERISA preemption" returns more
than 3000 hits.
25. See Sanson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 966 F.2d 618, 625 (11th Cir. 1992) (Birch, J.,
dissenting) ("Perhaps I have entered the thicket and lost the path that my brothers have found
and followed. However, if nothing else is clear it is that the 'path' is not; obviously the
Supreme Court needs to do some serious bushhogging in the ERISA preemption thicket.");
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General ERISA preemption contains an exception that appears in the
subsection immediately following the Preemption Clause.26 This exception is
the Savings Clause.27 The Savings Clause states that no part of ERISA "shall
be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which
regulates insurance, banking, or securities. ,28 The Savings Clause "saves" the
listed areas from ERISA preemption, which allows states to continue regulating
insurance, banking, and securities. 29 Like the bulk of the disputes involving the
Savings Clause, this Note will focus on the part of the Savings Clause that
refers to insurance (The Insurance Savings Clause). The Insurance Savings
Clause allows states to pass laws that regulate insurance without falling victim
to ERISA preemption.3 °
Although Congress wanted ERISA to create uniformity in all areas that
"relate to" 31 employee benefit plans, the legislation's drafters knew that the
32Savings Clause was needed to serve as an exception to general preemption.
Gonzales v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 901 F.2d 446,451-52 (W.D. La. 1990) ("Obviously,
any court forced to enter the ERISA preemption thicket sets out on a treacherous path.").
26. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000) ("Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the
provisions of this title ... shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan ....
27. Id. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
28. Id.
29. See Robert S. McDonough, Note, ERISA Preemption of State Mandated-Provider
Laws, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1194, 1200 (contending that what appeared to be excepted through the
Preemption Clause was actually restored to the states and considering whether mandated-
provider laws are a part of regulating insurance that Congress intended to save).
30. Even the Insurance Savings Clause has an exception-the Deemer Clause. 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(b)(2)(B) (2000). The Deemer Clause provides, "[N]either an employee benefit plan
described in section 1003(a) of this title, which is not exempt under section 1003(b) of this title
(other than a plan established primarily for the purpose of providing death benefits), nor any
trust established under such a plan" is an insurance company under the Insurance Savings
Clause. Id. Specifically, the clause states that these plans will not "be deemed to be an
insurance company or other insurer, bank, trust company, or investment company, or to be
engaged in the business of insurance or banking for the purposes of any law of any State
purporting to regulate insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust companies, or
investment companies." Id. This Note will not address the interplay between the Deemer
Clause and the Insurance Savings Clause in detail.
31. See id. § 1144(a) (using the "relate to" language).
32. See 120 CONG. REc. 29,942 (1974) (statement of Sen. Javitz) ("[C]omprehensive and
pervasive federal interest and the interest of uniformity with respect to interstate plans required-but
for certain exceptions--the displacement of State action in the field of private employee benefit
programs.") (emphasis added); 120 CONG. REc. 29,933 (1974) (statement ofSen. Williams) ("It should
be stressed that with the narrow exceptions specified in the bill, the substantive and enforcement
provisions of the conference substitute are intended to preempt the field for Federal regulations ....")
(emphasis added); 120 CONG. REc. 29,197 (1974) (statement of Rep. Dent) ("The conferees, with the
narrow exceptions specifically enumerated, applied [preemption] in its broadest sense to foreclose any
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Specifically, because most areas of insurance "relate to"'33 employee benefit
plans in some way and would fall under general ERISA preemption, the
Insurance Savings Clause was necessary to avoid preemption of all state
insurance laws. Outside of this broad purpose, the legislative history of the
Insurance Savings Clause is not helpful.34 Although Congress changed the
wording of the general Preemption Clause just before ERISA's passage,35 the
Savings Clause remained the way it had been under the weaker Preemption
36Clause. Justice Blackmun has stated that when the conference committee
broadened the preemption doctrine,37 there was "no indication in the legislative
history that Congress was aware of the new prominence given the saving[s]
clause in light of the rewritten pre-emption clause, or was aware that the
saving[s] clause was in conflict with the [new] general pre-emption
provision." 38 Despite Blackmun's criticism, the goal of the Insurance Savings
Clause remained the same-"[T]o preserve a state's ability to regulate
insurance. 
3 9
III. The Original Map
A. The Creation: Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts
Once Congress passed ERISA in 1974, courts grappled constantly with
questions of how to apply the Insurance Savings Clause within ERISA's
general preemption scheme. 40 They had no guidance until 1985 when they
non-Federal regulation of employee benefit plans.") (emphasis added).
33. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000).
34. See Robert N. Covington, Amending ERISA's Preemption Scheme, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 1, 10 (1999) (asserting that the true congressional purpose of the Savings Clause is hard
to ascertain because of the limited legislative history).
35. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text (noting that Congress altered the
wording of the general Preemption Clause just before passage).
36. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724, 745 (1985) (asserting that Congress did
not consider the new Preemption Clause's effect on the Savings Clause).
37. See Conison, supra note 22, at 619-20 (explaining that the final version of ERISA's
Preemption Clause was much stronger than the original drafts).
38. Metro. Life, 471 U.S. at 745.
39. Karen A. Jordan, ERISA Pre-emption: Integrating Fabe into the Savings Clause
Analysis, 27 RUTGERs L.J. 273, 337 (1996).
40. See David J. Brummond, Federal Preemption of State Insurance Regulation Under
ERISA, 62 IOWA L. REv. 57,93-122 (1976) (explaining how courts first attempted to deal with
ERISA's many issues); Theodore Paul Manno, ERISA Preemption and the McCarran-Ferguson
Act: The Need for Congressional Action, 52 TEMP. L.Q. 51, 63-69 (1979) (outlining the
problems lower courts faced in early ERISA cases).
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received a map from the Supreme Court.4 1 The Supreme Court created a map
to govern the Insurance Savings Clause analysis in Metropolitan Life Insurance
42Co. v. Massachusetts. In Metropolitan Life, the Court attempted to explain
the relationship of the Savings Clause to ERISA's general preemption
scheme.43 Justice Blackmun knew that trying to explain ERISA preemption
presented an arduous challenge: "The two pre-emption sections, while clear
enough on their faces, perhaps are not a model of legislative drafting, for while
the general pre-emption clause broadly pre-empts state law, the saving[s] clause
appears broadly to preserve the States' lawmaking power over much of the
same regulation. "44
In Metropolitan Life, the Massachusetts attorney general sued several
insurers in Massachusetts state court to enforce a statute45 that required health
care plans to provide a minimum level of mental health services. 46
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. and the other insurance providers argued that
the state law "related to" employee benefit plans and should be preempted by
ERISA. Massachusetts asserted that even though the law related to employee
benefit plans, it was exempt from preemption because of the Insurance Savings
Clause.4 7 After deciding that the state law fit easily within the broad scope of
ERISA's Preemption Clause," the Court set forth the analysis to determine
whether the Insurance Savings Clause applied to a law that otherwise would be
preempted.49
The first step in the analysis consisted of a basic common-sense
component.50 The Court explained that a law must "regulate" insurance
according to common sense. 51 The mandated-benefits law in Metropolitan Life
regulated the terms of insurance contracts and thus satisfied the common-sense
41. See Metro. Life, 471 U.S. at 739-40 (creating a two-step analysis for courts to use
when analyzing the Insurance Savings Clause).
42. Id. at 740.
43. See Bogan, supra note 6, at 120 (observing that the interplay between the Preemption
Clause and the Savings Clause created a "difficult tension").
44. Metro. Life, 471 U.S. at 738-39.
45. It is not unusual for a state to require insurers to include coverage for services offered
by a certain group of healthcare providers, such as a mental health provider. See id. at 729 n.9
(explaining that a majority of states require insurance plans to mandate, or at least offer, services
offered by an optometrist).
46. Id. at 734.
47. Id. at 734-35.
48. Id. at 739.
49. Id. at 739-40.
50. See id. at 740 (analyzing the matter from a common-sense viewpoint).
51. Id.
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52component of the new analysis. To reinforce this contention, the Court
looked at the "Deemer Clause," which states that an employee benefit plan is
not an insurance company for purposes of any state law attempting to regulate
insurance contracts.5 3 Specifically, because the Deemer Clause only pertains to
state laws applying directly to benefit plans, the Court explained that laws
regulating insurance contracts that do not apply directly to benefit plans are not
covered by the Deemer Clause.54 Therefore, Congress intended these laws to
be covered by the Insurance Savings Clause.
55
The second step in the analysis involved the weighing of three factors
borrowed from Union Labor Life Insurance Co. v. Pireno,56 a case involving
the McCarran-Ferguson Act.57 The Pireno Court used a three-factor test to
determine what constituted the "business of insurance" for the purposes of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act.5 8 The three factors were: (1) whether the policy has
the effect of transferring or spreading the policyholder's risk; (2) whether the
practice is an integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and the
insured; and (3) whether the practice is limited to entities within the insurance
industry. 59  Although Pireno concerned the McCarran-Ferguson Act,
52. Id. at 740-41.
53. Id. at 740.
54. Id. at 740-41.
55. Id. at 741.
56. Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119 (1982). In Pireno, the Supreme
Court considered whether an insurer's use of a peer review committee to determine the
reasonableness of chiropractors' fees was the "business of insurance" under § 1012(b) of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act. Id. at 122. New York law required the New York State Chiropractic
Association's insurer, Union Labor Life Insurance Co. (ULL), to cover certain claims for
chiropractic treatments. Id. at 122. ULL's procedures required that these claims be limited to
reasonable charges for necessary medical care and services before any money was paid on them.
Id. To decide whether the claims were reasonable, ULL used the assistance of the New York
State Chiropractic Association's Peer Review Committee. Id. at 123. Pireno asserted that the
practices used by the Peer Review Committee violated antitrust law, but ULL claimed that these
practices were exempt from antitrust scrutiny because of being in the "business of insurance"
under the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Id. The Court then employed reasoning from Group Life &
Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979), to come up with the three-factor
test set forth in the text. Id. at 129. The Court held that the use of the Peer Review Committee
did not involve the "business of insurance." Id.
57. The McCarran-Ferguson Act was passed in 1945 and prevented the infringement of
the states' right to regulate the business of insurance. See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal
Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARv. L. REV. 2085, 2117 (2002) (explaining the rules of
interpretation in the McCarran-Ferguson Act).
58. McCarran-Ferguson Act, 59 Stat. 33, codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015
(2000).
59. Pireno, 458 U.S. at 129.
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Metropolitan Life applied these same factors to ERISA preemption.60 In
applying these factors to the mandated-benefit laws, Metropolitan Life concluded
that the mandated-benefit laws involved the state regulation of the "business of
insurance.' 61 Because the purpose of the mandated-benefit laws was to spread the
risks of mental health, it met the first factor of the test.62 Mandated-benefit laws also
played an integral role in the insurer-policyholder relationship by limiting the types
of insurance that an insurer could sell the policyholder.6 3 Therefore, the Court
found that the mandated-benefit laws met the second McCarran-Ferguson factor.64
Because the regulation applied only to insurers and not policyholders, the mandated-
benefit laws also met the third factor.65
It was a logical step for the Supreme Court to look to the McCarran-Ferguson
Act as it tried to flesh out the meaning of ERISA's Savings Clause because one of
the main purposes of the McCarran-Ferguson Act was to ensure that states would
still be able to regulate the business of insurance.66 Furthermore, the Insurance
Savings Clause is worded similarly to the McCarran-Ferguson Act's statement that
the business of insurance will be "subject to the laws of the several States. ,67 In
Metropolitan Life, the Court determined that the "saving[s] clause and the
McCarran-Ferguson Act serve the same federal policy and utilize similar language
to define what is left to the States.... Thus application of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act lends further support to our ruling that Congress did not intend mandated-
benefit laws to be pre-empted by ERISA."
68
The Supreme Court advanced a broad reading of the Insurance Savings
Clause in Metropolitan Life by considering basic common sense and the three
McCarran-Ferguson factors. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. and the other
insurers argued that the Court should undertake a more restrictive reading of
the clause, but the Court pointed to a "complete absence of evidence" that






66. See Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 217-18 (1979)
(asserting that the "primary concern" in enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act was to "ensure
that the States would continue to have the ability to tax and regulate the business of insurance").
67. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a) (2000); see Metro. Life, 471 U.S. at 744 n.21 (finding that the
Insurance Savings Clause was designed to preserve the regulation of the business of insurance
for the states, just as the McCarran-Ferguson Act did).
68. Metro. Life, 471 U.S. at 744 n.21.
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Congress intended the clause to necessitate such a narrow reading. 69 In fact,
under the Court's broad approach, the presumption was against preemption
whenever a law having to do with insurance was in dispute.7° As Justice
Blackmun explained, "The presumption is against pre-emption, and we are not
inclined to read limitations into federal statutes in order to enlarge their pre-
emptive scope.",
7 1
B. Defining the Boundaries: Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux
In Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux,72 decided just two years after
Metropolitan Life, the Supreme Court changed course and undertook a
narrower reading of the Insurance Savings Clause.73 In Pilot Life, the issue
before the Court was whether ERISA preempted state common law tort and
contract suits filed because of an insurance company's mishandling of benefit
claims.74 Everate Dedeaux was an employee of Entex, Inc. (Entex) in Gulfport,
Mississippi, when he injured his back during the course of his employment.75
He filed a claim for permanent disability benefits with Entex, which filed a
claim with its insurer, Pilot Life Insurance Co. (Pilot Life).76 Pilot Life
terminated Dedeaux's benefits after two years.77 Pilot Life then reinstated his
benefits several times after the initial termination, but eventually terminated the
benefits entirely. 78 Dedeaux sued Pilot Life in federal district court under
69. Id. at 745-46. The Court went on to say, "We therefore decline to impose any
limitation on the saving clause beyond those Congress imposed in the clause itself and in the
'deemer clause' which modifies it." Id. The Court stressed, "Nothing in the language, structure,
or legislative history of the Act supports a more narrow reading of the clause, whether it be the
Supreme Judicial Court's attempt to save only state regulations unrelated to the substantive
provisions of ERISA, or the insurers' more speculative attempt to read the saving clause out of
the statute." Id. at 746-47.
70. Id. at 741.
71. Id. Other judges in this time period did not agree with this interpretation. See, e.g.,
Att'y General v. Travelers Ins. Co., 463 N.E.2d 548, 552 (Mass. 1984) (Wilkens, J., dissenting)
(suggesting the Savings Clause needs to be construed narrowly to promote uniformity across the
board).
72. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
73. See Bogan, supra note 6, at 124-30 (asserting Pilot Life limited the scope of the
Insurance Savings Clause compared to Metropolitan Life).
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common law breach of contract and tort principles that amounted to a claim of
bad faith.79 The district court granted summary judgment to Pilot Life because
it believed that ERISA preempted the bad faith claim. 80 Relying on the
Supreme Court's decision in Metropolitan Life, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit reversed.8'
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision authored by Justice
O'Connor, noted that there was no question that Dedeaux's claim fell within
the purview of express ERISA preemption. 2 The Court then analyzed the bad
faith cause of action8 3 to determine whether the Insurance Savings Clause saved
it from preemption under the Metropolitan Life analysis. 84
First, the Court employed the common-sense part of the analysis.85 The
Court focused on the phrase "regulates insurance" to determine whether the
Mississippi bad faith law fell within the scope of the phrase's intended
meaning.86 The Court stated that a common-sense view of the word "regulates"
implied that a law actually must be directed toward the insurance industry.87
Merely having an impact on the insurance industry, according to the Court,
would not cause a law to fall under the Insurance Savings Clause.88 The
Mississippi bad faith regime, despite the Mississippi Supreme Court's opinion
that the law was linked to the insurance industry, was replete throughout the
state's contract and tort jurisprudence.89 Because Mississippi's bad faith law
was not specifically directed at the insurance industry, the Court concluded that
the Mississippi law of bad faith was not a state law that "regulates insurance"
according to common sense. 9°
79. Id. The district court had jurisdiction based on diversity. Id.
80. Id. at44.
81. Dedeaux v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 770 F.2d 1311, 1317 (5th Cir. 1985).
82. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987).
83. See id. at 48 n. 1 (explaining that to be a law that "regulates insurance" and thus fall
under the Savings Clause, a discrete statute is not necessary). For the purposes of the Insurance
Savings Clause, "the term 'State law' includes all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other
State action having the effect of law, of any State." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1) (2000).
84. See supra Part IlI.A (setting forth an analysis to be used when determining whether
the Insurance Savings Clause saves a state statute from ERISA preemption).





90. Id. at 49-50.
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Second, the Court looked at the three McCarran-Ferguson factors. 9 1 The
Court concluded that the factors did not weigh in favor of finding that the state
law regulated insurance.92 Because "the Mississippi common law of bad faith
[did] not effect a spreading of policyholder risk," the state law failed the first
factor.93 Although the Court said the state common law of bad faith possibly
met the second factor, which requires the practice to be an integral part of the
policy relationship between the insurer and the insured, the law probably did
not meet the second factor because it failed to define the terms of the insurer-
insured relationship. 94 The Mississippi common law of bad faith certainly was
not limited to entities within the insurance industry and thus failed the third
factor as well.95 Therefore, because the Mississippi bad faith law met one of
the three factors at most, the analysis of the McCarran-Ferguson factors did not
support an assertion that the Mississippi bad faith regime "regulates
insurance. 
9 6
In addition to the common-sense interpretation of the Savings Clause and
the McCarran-Ferguson factors, the Supreme Court considered ERISA as a
whole.97 The Court found additional support for its holding in ERISA's civil
enforcement provisions.98 Under the ERISA provisions, relief can consist of
accrued benefits due, a declaratory judgment on the right to benefits, an
injunction against a plan administrator for improperly failing to pay benefits,
91. Id.at5O-51.
92. ld. at 51.
93. id.
94. See id. at 51 ("In contrast to the mandated-benefits law in Metropolitan Life, the
common law of bad faith does not define the terms of the relationship between the insurer and
the insured; it declares only that, whatever terms have been agreed upon in the insurance
contract, a breach of that contract may in certain circumstances allow the policyholder to obtain
punitive damages."). Therefore, the law of bad faith is not any more integral to the policy
relationship than general contract law is to any contract made within the state. Id.; see also
Anschultz v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 850 F.2d 1467, 1468-69 (11 th Cir. 1988) (finding that
despite satisfying the common-sense requirement by being directed specifically at the insurance
industry, a Florida law similar to the Mississippi bad faith law in Pilot Life did not meet the
second McCarran-Ferguson factor). But see Bogan, supra note 6, at 135 (suggesting that
decisions such as Anschultz defy common sense by asserting that laws such as the unfair
practice statute at bar in that case were not integral to the insurer-insured relationship).
95. See Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 51 (noting that the Mississippi law of bad faith, despite
possibly being associated with the insurance industry, "has developed from general principles of
tort and contract law available in any Mississippi breach of contract case").
96. Id. at 50-51.
97. Id. at 51-57.
98. Id. at 52-54; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2000) (outlining the potential relief available
for violations of ERISA on the part of either an employee benefit plan participant or
beneficiary).
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the removal of a fiduciary if the claim is for breach of fiduciary duty, and the
potential awarding of attorney fees.99 Dedeaux, however, sought a remedy not
contained in ERISA's civil enforcement provisions.l0°° The Court construed the
civil enforcement provisions to include the exclusive remedies available under
ERISA and stated that individuals who asserted claims based on different state
laws would create an unnecessary obstacle to the purposes of Congress.101
Justice O'Connor wrote, "[T]he detailed [civil enforcement] provisions ... set
forth a comprehensive civil enforcement scheme that represents a careful
balancing of the need for prompt and fair claims settlement procedures against
the public interest in encouraging the formation of employee benefit plans."
10 2
The Court suggested that ERISA impliedly preempted state laws that provided
remedies not listed explicitly in the civil enforcement provisions. 0 3 Because
Dedeaux sought treble and punitive damages, which were not available under
ERISA's civil enforcement provisions, ERISA impliedly preempted his
claims.'
0 4
Pilot Life limited the effect of the Insurance Savings Clause and
broadened the scope of ERISA preemption. 105  The Court pointed to a
conference committee report on ERISA that compared the preemption regime
of ERISA to the preemption regime of the Labor-Management Relations Act of
1947 (LMRA).' ° Section 301 of the LMRA preempted all state actions
asserting violations of contracts between employers and labor organizations,
99. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 53-54.
100. See Bogan, supra note 6, at 127 (describing ERISA's civil enforcement provisions
and noting that Dedeaux's claim asked for a remedy not contained in them).
101. See id. at 52 (basing this conclusion on the language and structure of the enforcement
provisions and the legislative history); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae the United States at 18-
10, Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987) (No. 85-1043) ("[Wle think that
Congress intended ERISA's provisions relating to enforcement of participants' rights under
benefit plans to be exclusive.").
102. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 54.
103. See Bogan, supra note 6, at 127 (describing the Court's implied preemption analysis);
see also Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 57 (distinguishing Metropolitan Life by asserting that in Pilot
Life, the Court is considering "whether Congress might clearly express, through the structure
and legislative history of a particular substantive provision of ERISA, an intention that the
federal remedy provided by that provision displace state causes of action").
104. See Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 54 (stating that "ERISA's civil enforcement remedies were
intended to be exclusive").
105. See Bogan, supra note 6, at 127-28 (suggesting that Pilot Life narrowed Metropolitan
Life's interpretation of the Insurance Savings Clause by using the legislative history of the
Preemption Clause to infer a broad congressional intent to preempt).
106. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 93-1280, at 327 (1974), quoted in Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 55.
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even if the state action authorized a remedy that was otherwise unavailable
under the federal act. 107
By narrowing Metropolitan Life's interpretation of the Insurance Savings
Clause, Pilot Life, at least in the area of common law bad faith claims, limited
the value of the Savings Clause.10 8 In the aftermath of Pilot Life, courts have
ruled that ERISA preempts a wide range of state common law tort and contract
claims.10 9 Had the Pilot Life Court stopped its discussion after its express
preemption analysis, the Savings Clause would have retained its previous
importance. By holding, however, that Dedeaux's claims were impliedly
preempted because ERISA's civil enforcement provisions did not contain the
remedy asked for, the Court basically eliminated the viability of any state-law
claims for extracontractual damages made under employee benefit plans.1 10
C. No Map Can Cover Everything: The Effect of Implied Preemption
Pilot Life's analysis of implied preemption has been sharply criticized
because it was not confined exclusively to pension plan cases."' Because it
107. See Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S.
1, 23 (1983) (finding § 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act has "pre-emptive force...
so powerful as to displace entirely any state cause of action 'for violation of contracts between
an employer and a labor organization.' Any such suit is purely a creature of federal law...").
Commentators have offered three possible explanations for the reference to the Labor-
Management Relations Act: (1) courts should look to pre-ERISA cases dealing with the Labor-
Management Relations Act when formulating ERISA's federal common law; (2) courts should
use state law as a source of rules; or (3) courts should employ the common law under ERISA as
they do under the Labor-Management Relations Act. See generally George Lee Flint, Jr.,
ERISA: Reformulating the Federal Common Law for Plan Interpretation, 32 SAN DiEGO L.
REv. 955, 973-78 (1995).
108. See Bogan, supra note 6, at 129 (asserting that Pilot Life's interpretation of the
Insurance Savings Clause was narrower than Metropolitan Life's).
109. See Troy A. Price, Preemption "Between the Poles:" ERISA's Effect on State
Common Law Actions Other than Benefit Claims, 19 U. ARK. LrTlE ROCK L.J. 541, 541 (1997)
(noting that in the decade since Pilot Life, ERISA has "swept with extraordinary force across the
field of state common laws regulating relationships between those who seek to collect health,
life, disability, or other job-related benefits and those who either sponsor such benefits or play
some role in deciding benefit claims").
110. See Donald T. Bogan, Protecting Patient Rights Despite ERISA: Will the Supreme
Court Allow States to Regulate Managed Care?, 74 TUL. L. REv. 951, 993 (2000) ("The result
of the Court's implied preemption analysis was to eliminate plan participants' state-law claims
for extracontractual damages, including punitive damages and treble damages, and to put plan
participants in a significantly worse position than they were prior to ERISA.").
111. See id. at 995-96 (suggesting that Pilot Life's implied preemption analysis "put the
cart before the horse" and that it should have been limited to pension plan cases). "The
Supreme Court's opinion in Pilot Life was flawed from the outset." Id. at 995.
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operates beyond the scope of ERISA's actual language, implied preemption
infringes on even more areas of traditional state regulation than express
preemption. " 2 Although this Note is concerned primarily with the Insurance
Savings Clause and its role in express preemption, implied preemption is still
important because it applies to all claims, even those that would be "saved"
from express preemption.'13 Two key cases are particularly helpful in
examining this issue in detail. 114 First, Ramirez v. Inter-Continental Hotels"5
demonstrated that a court would use the Pilot Life implied preemption analysis
to find preemption of a state statute even if express preemption did not
apply."16 Second, Tri-State Machine, Inc. v. Nationwide Life Insurance Co. 117
112. Id. at 1003.
113. See id. at 1002-03 (explaining that implied preemption analysis has a negative effect
for consumers because it most often preempts claims for bad faith or unfair practices that seek
extracontractual remedies, which limits the manner that a court may punish an insurance
company).
114. For more cases that applied Pilot Life's implied preemption analysis, see Kanne v.
Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 867 F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding preemption of a California
statute prohibiting unfair processing of claims); In re Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 857 F.2d 1190
(8th Cir. 1988) (concluding that ERISA preempted a Missouri statute prohibiting continuous
refusal to pay insurance claims); Juckett v. Beecham Home Improvement Prod., 684 F. Supp.
448 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (holding that ERISA preempted a Texas statute that penalized delaying
the payment of insurance benefits); and Rasmussen v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 675 F. Supp. 1497
(W.D. La. 1987) (finding that ERISA preempted a Louisiana statute prohibiting improper
handling of insurance claims).
115. Ramirez v. Inter-Continental Hotels, 890 F.2d 760 (5th Cir. 1989). In Ramirez, the
Fifth Circuit considered whether ERISA preempted Peter Ramirez's claims for breach of
contract, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, and other alleged violations of the Texas
Insurance Code and Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Id. at 761-62. Peter Ramirez, a
restaurant manager for Inter-Continental Hotels, received insurance coverage from Travelers
Insurance Co. under an employee benefit plan. Id. at 761. Ramirez suffered medical expenses
for a prolonged illness that began in 1986, and he filed suit against his employer and Travelers
when Travelers refused to reimburse him. Id. at 761-62. Ramirez argued that the applicable
section of the Texas Insurance Code was a statute that "regulates insurance" and should not fall
under ERISA preemption. Id. at 763. The court, despite admitting the possibility that the Texas
statute could be saved by the Insurance Savings Clause, reasoned that even if it was, ERISA still
preempted his claims because Ramirez was seeking to recover remedies not available under
ERISA. Id.
116. See id. at 762-63 (explaining that the implied preemption analysis and the express
preemption analysis should be conducted separately).
117. Tri-State Mach., Inc. v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 33 F.3d 309 (4th Cir. 1994). In Tri-
State Machine, the Fourth Circuit decided whether ERISA preempted Tri-State Machine's state-
law claims asserting improper claims processing. Id. at 310. Nationwide Life Insurance Co.
insured Tri-State Machine's employees for benefit claims exceeding $25,000 per employee per
year with an employee benefit plan explicitly governed by ERISA. Id. at 311. Tri-State
Machine sued Nationwide Life on various common law grounds and for violation of the West
Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act in West Virginia circuit court after Nationwide Life
terminated its contract on July 1, 1989. Id. Despite the West Virginia Legislature's attempts to
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demonstrates the outer limits of Pilot Life application." 1
8
In Ramirez, the Fifth Circuit reviewed an employee's claim against his
former employer and its insurance provider.1 9 The employee claimed
compensatory and punitive damages based on alleged violations of the Texas
Insurance Code and the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act.120 Because his
claims "relat[ed] to an employee benefit plan" and ordinarily would be
preempted by ERISA, 12 1 the court had to determine whether the claim escaped
preemption under the Insurance Savings Clause. 122 The court reviewed the
section of the Texas Insurance Code providing a private right of action to
persons damaged by unfair practices in the business of insurance. 123 Under
Metropolitan Life's common-sense approach, the Texas statute was specifically
directed at the business of insurance. 24 Ramirez then examined the three
McCarran-Ferguson factors. The court stated that the Texas statute "plainly
fails to satisfy" the factors requiring a spreading of policyholder risk and an
integral relationship between the insurer and the insured.125  Although the
statute was specifically related to the insurance industry, this was the only
McCarran-Ferguson factor that was potentially satisfied.
126
Had the court stopped after performing its express preemption analysis
and ruled that preemption applied because the Insurance Savings Clause did not
save the Texas statute, this case would be of little importance in the
understanding of the evolution of the Insurance Savings Clause analysis.
place the statute within the meaning of the "business of insurance," the court ruled that the law
was not specifically directed at the insurance industry. Id. at 314-15. The court stated that "this
type of regulation is not unique to the business of insurance, and it does not target, at least in
these provisions, the core business of insurance which involves contracts of protection under
which risk is spread among policy holders." Id. at 314.
118. See id. at 310-16 (asserting that lower courts were not interpreting Metropolitan Life
in the way the Supreme Court intended).
119. Ramirez, 890 F.2d at 761.
120. Id. at 762.
121. See id. ("Ramirez's efforts to collect his medical benefits 'relate to an employee
benefit plan' and thus come within the scope of ERISA's express preemption provision ...
which declares that ERISA 'supersede[s] any and all state laws insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan ... .
122. Id. at 763.
123. See id. at 763 (noting that Section 16 of the Texas Insurance Code allows treble
damages and attorneys' fees to persons injured by "unfair methods of competition and unfair
and deceptive acts or practices in the business of insurance").
124. Id. at 762-63.
125. Id. at 763.
126. See id. ("At most, therefore, [the Texas statute] satisfies one of three criteria used to
interpret the phrase 'regulates insurance' in the ERISA savings clause.").
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Despite finding that the Texas statute met one McCarran-Ferguson factor at
most, the court explained that this law was more closely related to the insurance
industry than Pilot Life's Mississippi bad faith law. 127 The court noted that
even if the law would have met the three McCarran-Ferguson factors and been
saved by the Insurance Savings Clause, it would still be preempted because of
the implied preemption theory announced in Pilot Life.128 Implied preemption
applied here for the same reason it did in Pilot Life-because the employee
sought remedies not available under ERISA.1
29
Over the next five years, the courts of appeals continued to apply implied
preemption, even when courts found statutes saved from express preemption by
the Insurance Savings Clause. The Fourth Circuit broadly applied this doctrine
in Tri-State Machine.'30 Tri-State Machine, Inc. (Tri-State) maintained an
employee benefit plan insured by Nationwide Life Insurance Co.
(Nationwide).' 31 In addition to a group policy, Tri-State had an agreement with
Nationwide whereby Tri-State paid claims up to $25,000 per employee per
year, and Nationwide insured against any additional amounts.1 ' When
Nationwide terminated this agreement, Tri-State sued for improper
management and processing of claims under the West Virginia Unfair Trade
Practices Act. 133 Tri-State argued that its claims arose from the West Virginia
Unfair Trade Practices Act and because that act was designed to regulate
insurance companies, Tri-State's claims should be saved from preemption by
the Insurance Savings Clause.
13 4
Despite the West Virginia Legislature's attempt to place the Unfair Trade
Practices Act within the meaning of "the business of insurance," 35 the court
127. Id.
128. Id.; see supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text (finding that ERISA impliedly
preempted an employee's claim because he sought a remedy not contained in ERISA's civil
enforcement provisions).
129. Ramirez, 890 F.2d at 763-64.
130. Tri-State Mach., Inc. v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 33 F.3d 309 (4th Cir. 1994).
131. Id. at 310.
132. Id. at 311.
133. See id. at 311 (noting that Tri-State sued Nationwide for failing to abide by the
agreement, mismanaging claims by paying the wrong medical providers, issuing coverage cards
in the names of non-Tri-State employees, paying claims not covered, and failing to pay claims
that were covered).
134. Id. at 313.
135. Id. at 314. The West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act states:
The purpose of this article is to regulate trade practices in the business of
insurance... by defining, or providing for the determination of, all such practices
in this State which constitute unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive
acts or practices and by prohibiting the trade practices so defined or determined.
660
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stated that the Act did not target the business of insurance, nor was it unique to
the business of insurance. 136 The court followed an earlier West Virginia case
that had decided that the Unfair Trade Practices Act did not regulate the
business of insurance. 137 In making this determination, however, the court did
not employ the Metropolitan Life analysis-in other words, asking if the statute
was specifically directed at the business of insurance. 138 Instead, the Fourth
Circuit asserted that the Metropolitan Life Court had concluded "that Congress
intended to save from preemption only those state laws that regulate the
traditional business of insurance to the extent that it involves contractual
arrangements for protection against financial loss through the spreading of
risk." 139 The Metropolitan Life Court did not reach this conclusion. 14° Tri-
State Machine interpreted the spreading of policyholder risk to be the only
determinate factor when applying the Insurance Savings Clause.141  As
previously stated, however, the spreading of policyholder risk represents only
one of three factors adopted from the caselaw surrounding the McCarran-
Ferguson Act. 4 2 By ruling that ERISA preempted all of Tri-State's claims
without correctly applying the map set forth by the Supreme Court in
Metropolitan Life, Tri-State Machine highlighted the fact that lower courts
were having trouble applying the Insurance Savings Clause.
This problem did not go unnoticed. Judge Luttig's dissent in Tri-State
Machine sharply criticized the majority's conclusions. 143 Judge Luttig asserted
W. VA. CODE § 33-11-1 (2003).
136. Tri-State Mach., Inc., 33 F.3d at 314.
137. Id.; see Custer v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 410, 419-22 (4th Cir. 1993)
(asserting that because the West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act does not exclusively
regulate the business of insurance as defined in Metropolitan Life, the Act was not saved from
preemption).
138. See supra Part II.A (setting forth an analysis to be used when applying the Insurance
Savings Clause).
139. Tri-State Mach., Inc., 33 F.3d at 312.
140. See Bogan, supra note 6, at 138 (explaining that the Metropolitan Life Court
expressly rejected the argument that the Savings Clause only exempts "traditional" insurance
laws from ERISA preemption); see also Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724, 741-42
(1985) (asserting that there is no indication in the legislative history that Congress had in mind a
distinction between traditional and innovative insurance laws).
141. Tri-State Mach., Inc., 33 F.3d at 314; see also Bogan, supra note 6, at 139
(contending that the Tri-State Machine majority placed the spreading of policyholder risk factor
not only above just the other two McCarran-Ferguson Act factors, but also above the common-
sense analysis originally outlined in Metropolitan Life).
142. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (listing the three McCarran-Ferguson
factors).
143. Tri-State Mach., Inc., 33 F.3d at 316-19 (Luttig, J., dissenting).
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that the majority confused the Savings Clause analysis by applying the Pilot
Life holding too broadly. 44 Specifically, Luttig argued that the majority
erroneously construed Pilot Life to preempt all state law actions for the
improper processing of claims. 45 Pilot Life, however, only dealt with the
question of whether ERISA preempted a plan participant's claim under a
Mississippi bad faith law. 1
46
Judge Luttig stressed that if the majority had applied the map set forth in
Metropolitan Life, the court would have found that the Insurance Savings
Clause saved the West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act from preemption. 1
47
Unlike the bad faith law in Pilot Life, the law in Tri-State was specifically
directed at the business of insurance. Judge Luttig wrote, "If any law can be
said to be 'specifically directed toward [the insurance] industry,' 148 it is this
statute, which by terms, was enacted to, and does, 'regulate trade practices in
the business of insurance.'" 149 Judge Luttig also reached a conclusion that was
different than the majority's when he considered the McCarran-Ferguson
factors. The Act did affect the spreading of policyholder risk because it
explained how and when liability was to be transferred from Tri-State to
Nationwide.150 In addition, the application of the Act to determine which of
Tri-State's claims were covered by Nationwide's stop-loss insurance policy
affected an integral part of the insurer-insured relationship.' 51 The Act also
regulated insurance, which allowed it to satisfy the third factor.' 52 Judge Luttig
also noted that implied preemption would not be applicable in this case
because, although the civil enforcement provisions provide exclusive remedies
for beneficiaries and plan participants, the provisions do not apply to employers
such as Tri-State.1
53
144. See id. at 316 (Luttig, J., dissenting) ("In my view, Pilot Life did not sweep quite so
broadly, and applying here the saving clause analysis undertaken by the Supreme Court in Pilot
Life requires us to hold that Tri-State's state action is saved from preemption.").
145. Id. at 317 (Luttig, J., dissenting).
146. Id. (Luttig, J., dissenting); see also supra Part III.B (finding that ERISA preempted
Mississippi's bad faith regime).
147. Tri-State Mach., Inc., 33 F.3d at 317-18 (Luttig, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 318 (Luttig, J., dissenting) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41,
56 (1987)).
149. Id. (Luttig, J., dissenting) (quoting W. VA. CODE § 33-11-1 (2003)).
150. Id. (Luttig, J., dissenting).
151. Id. (Luttig, J., dissenting).
152. See id. (Luttig, J., dissenting) ("Tri-State's action plainly does, therefore, regulate 'the
business of insurance' in accordance with the McCarran-Ferguson Act.").
153. Id. (Luttig, J., dissenting).
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The Supreme Court responded to cases like Tri-State Machine less than a
year later when it decided New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue
Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.154  Although Travelers did not
specifically concern the Insurance Savings Clause, the case is important
because the Court attempted to reign in the overly broad ERISA preemption
doctrine that was evolving in lower courts. 155 The Court focused on the tenet of
statutory construction that dictated that federal statutes should not preempt
areas traditionally legislated by the states unless the federal act directly required
such preemption. 156 Even though Metropolitan Life used this tenet of statutory
construction in Savings Clause jurisprudence, 157 lower courts were forgetting
this important fact. 5 8 Despite Travelers's clear message, lower courts failed to
apply this tenet of statutory construction to Savings Clause cases, forcing the
Supreme Court to directly address the problem.
159
D. The Mapmaker Attempts To Clarify
1. UNUM Life Insurance Co. v. Ward
In its 1999 decision, UNUM Life Insurance Co. of America v. Ward, the
Supreme Court seized the opportunity to clarify the Savings Clause analysis.
16°
Management Analysis Co. (MAC) was covered by a long-term employee
154. N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S.
645 (1995). In Travelers, the Supreme Court had to determine whether ERISA preempted a
New York statute that exacted surcharges for hospital care. Id. at 649. The Court ruled that
ERISA did not preempt such a state statute because it did not "relate" to employee benefit plans.
Id. at 662-64. The statutes did not mention any employee benefit plan that would be covered by
ERISA and there was no connection between the statutes and ERISA plans. Id. at 663-64. The
Court also noted that the history of Medicare regulation confirmed that Congress did not intend
for ERISA to preempt state regulation of health care cost control. Id. at 665-67.
155. See Bogan, supra note 6, at 140-41 (describing the problems facing the lower courts
in applying the Insurance Savings Clause).
156. See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 655 ("[W]here federal law is said to bar state action in
fields of traditional state regulation, we have worked on the 'assumption that the historic police
powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress."' (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947))).
157. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724, 735-47 (1985).
158. See Bogan, supra note 6, at 141 ("The lower federal courts did not immediately
recognize that the Court's shift away from a very broad view of ERISA preemption under the
statute's preemption clause in Travelers should inform the savings clause analysis.").
159. Id.
160. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358 (1999).
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benefit plan by UNUM Life Insurance Co. (UNUM), which specified that all
claims must be filed within one year and 180 days from the commencement of
a disability.161 John Ward, an employee of MAC, was permanently disabled
because of severe leg pain diagnosed as diabetic neuropathy in December
1992.162 Although Ward filed a claim with MAC, UNUM did not receive the
claim until April 11, 1994.163 Because UNUM did not receive the claim within
a year and 180 days, the claim was untimely and UNUM asserted that it was
not contractually obligated to pay the claim. 64 Ward brought suit under
California's notice-prejudice rule, 165 a rule that excused untimely insurance
claims unless the insurance company could prove that the delay caused actual
prejudice. 
166
The Supreme Court focused on whether the Insurance Savings Clause
saved California's notice-prejudice rule from preemption.167 Rather than
conduct a common-sense analysis of its own, the Court borrowed the Ninth
Circuit's conclusion reached when interpreting the same notice-prejudice rule
in Cisneros v. UNUM Life Insurance Co.168 In Cisneros, the Ninth Circuit
stated that "by requiring the insurer to prove prejudice before enforcing proof-
of-claim requirements, the notice-prejudice rule dictates the terms of the
relationship between the insurer and insured and so seems ... to 'regulate
insurance.'" 169 The fact that the law was specifically directed at the insurance
161. Id. at 364.
162. Id. at 364-65.
163. Id. at 365.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 365-67.
166. See Shell Oil Co. v. Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co., 12 Cal. App. 4th 715,760-61 (1993)
("[A] defense based on an insured's failure to give timely notice [of a claim] requires the insurer
to prove that it suffered actual prejudice. Prejudice is not presumed from delayed notice alone.
The insurer must show actual prejudice.").
167. See Ward, 526 U.S. at 367 (noting that both parties agreed that the notice-prejudice
rule would be preempted by ERISA if not saved by the Insurance Savings Clause).
168. Cisneros v. UNUM Life Ins. Co., 134 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 1998). In Cisneros, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that the Insurance Savings Clause saved California's notice-prejudice
rule from ERISA preemption. Id. at 945. In this case, an employee filed a claim for disability
benefits, but did not do so within the required time frame set forth by the insurance contract. Id.
at 942. UNUM denied the employee's claim, which caused the employee to file suit against
UNUM. Id. Although UNUM argued that ERISA preempted any claim under the California
law, the Ninth Circuit decided that the Insurance Savings Clause saved the law because it was a
law that "regulates insurance." Id. at 945.
169. Id. at 945.
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industry and also exclusively regulated insurance contracts aided the
analysis.
170
UNUM contended that the Supreme Court should not adopt the Ninth
Circuit's common-sense conclusion because, although the California law was
industry-specific, it was just a restatement of the general contract principle to
avoid disproportionate forfeitures.171  The Court acknowledged that the
California law in dispute was designed to prevent disproportionate
forfeitures, 72 but noted that the law was "an application of a special order, a
rule mandatory for insurance contracts, not a principle a court may pliably
employ when the circumstances so warrant.' 73  The Court went on to
distinguish this California law from other contract cases. 174 For example, under
the notice-prejudice law, the party trying to enforce the contract ordinarily has
the burden of justification. 75 In contrast, in cases outside the notice-prejudice
context, the party trying to enforce the contract does not have the burden of
justification-instead, the burden of justifying a departure from the contract
rests with the party seeking the departure.
176
The most important facet of the Ward case was the Supreme Court's
treatment of the McCarran-Ferguson factors. 177 Prior to Ward, several circuits
had held that in order to fall under the Insurance Savings Clause, a state law
must pass the common-sense analysis and meet each of the three McCarran-
Ferguson factors. 178 Ward, however, rejected this view and ruled that the
McCarran-Ferguson factors were merely "guideposts." 179 As guideposts, each
170. Id.
171. See UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 368-69 (1999) (stating that
UNUM believed that the California law resembles the Mississippi bad faith law at bar in Pilot
Life).
172. Id. at 370-71.




177. The McCarran-Ferguson factors were first used in Insurance Savings Clause
jurisprudence in Metropolitan Life. For a discussion of Metropolitan Life, see supra Part III.A.
178. See CIGNA Healthplan of La., Inc. v. Louisiana, 82 F.3d 642, 650 (5th Cir. 1996)
(finding that a court had to be able to answer "yes" to each of the three McCarran-Ferguson
factors); Tingle v. Pac. Mut. Ins. Co., 996 F.2d 105, 110 n.25 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting several
cases where state laws failed to fall under the Savings Clause because they met only one
McCarran-Ferguson factor); DeBruyne v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the U.S., 920 F.2d
457. 468-70 (7th Cir. 1990) (asserting that the McCarran-Ferguson factors are more stringent
than the common-sense analysis).
179. See UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 374 (1999) (stating that the
Ninth Circuit properly looked to the factors as guideposts).
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of the factors were relevant, but satisfying one particular factor, or all three
factors, was not required for the Insurance Savings Clause to apply. 8' The
Court explained that to determine whether the Insurance Savings Clause
applies, courts must first use the common-sense analysis and then look to the
McCarran-Ferguson factors to aide the common-sense analysis.' 8' Based on
this analysis, the Court contended that the notice-prejudice rule possibly met
the spreading of policyholder risk factor. 82 Whether it did or not, however,
was not important because the law easily met the other two factors of the test
and was thus saved from preemption.183
2. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran
Ward's clarification of the Insurance Savings Clause analysis made it
easier for a state law to be saved from ERISA preemption. 184 Ward simplified
the analysis and made it easier for lower courts to apply the analysis, even in
complicated cases such as Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran. 1 5 In Rush,
the Supreme Court decided whether the Insurance Savings Clause was
applicable to health maintenance organizations (HMOs), despite the fact that
HMOs were medical providers in addition to insurers.186 The Supreme Court
held that the Insurance Savings Clause applied "as long as providing insurance
fairly accounts for the application of state law."' 87 Thus, for the purposes of the
Insurance Savings Clause, the state law in question did not have to be directed
180. Id. at 373; see also O'Connor v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 146 F.3d 959, 963
(D.C. Cir. 1998) ("That the factors are merely 'relevant' suggests that they need not all point in
the same direction, else they would be 'required."').
181. See Ward, 526 U.S. at 373-74 ("As the Ninth Circuit correctly recognized,
Metropolitan Life asked first whether the law there in question 'fit a common-sense
understanding of insurance regulation,' ... and then looked to the McCarran-Ferguson factors
as checking points or 'guideposts, not separate essential elements.., that must each be
satisfied' to save the State's law." (quoting Cisneros v. UNUM Life Ins. Co., 134 F.3d 939,
945-46 (9th Cir. 1998))).
182. Id. at 374.
183. See id. at 374-75 (finding that the notice-prejudice rule serves an integral part of the
insurer-insured relationship and is limited to the insurance industry).
184. See Bogan, supra note 6, at 139-41 (suggesting that after Travelers and Ward, the
presumption against preemption is strong in nonpension employee benefits cases, including
those claims that fall under the Insurance Savings Clause).
185. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002).
186. Id. at 367. Rush argued that the Insurance Savings Clause could not save laws
affecting HMOs because HMOs are not specifically a part of the insurance industry. Id.
187. Id. at 367.
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exclusively at entities that only regulate insurance.' 88 The Supreme Court cited
congressional intent at length to aide the conclusion that the Insurance Savings
Clause was applicable to HMOs.' 89
In Rush Prudential, Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. (Rush) insured the
employer of Debra Moran's husband through an employee welfare benefit
plan. 90 According to the plan, Rush was responsible for paying for "medically
necessary" services. 91 After suffering from continual pain and numbness in
her right shoulder, Debra Moran's physician requested that she undergo a
specialized type of surgery to repair the condition. 92 Rush, however, did not
classify the specialized surgery as "medically necessary," and Rush denied
coverage for the specialized surgery. 93 Rush instead informed Moran that she
needed to undergo a more standardized procedure to be performed by a Rush-
affiliated physician. 194 Moran then sued Rush under the Illinois HMO Act.
95
After determining that ERISA would preempt Moran's claim, the
Supreme Court had to determine whether the Insurance Savings Clause
applied. 196  Once the Court determined that HMOs were "risk-bearing
188. See id. ("Nothing in the saving clause requires an either-or choice between health
care and insurance in deciding a preemption question .... ").
189. See id. at 367-72 (examining Congress's intent behind HMO legislation). When
Congress passed the HMO Act of 1973, health maintenance organizations were intended to be
an alternate means for bearing risk that would become an important part of the insurance
industry. See HMO Act of 1973, § 1301(c), 87 Stat. 916, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 300e(c)
(2000) (noting that when Congress specified that the new HMOs would have to meet certain
federal requirements, that HMOs would be required to bear and manage risk). Congress defined
HMOs by referencing risk, management of risk, and recognition that states regulated HMOs as
insurers. Rush Prudential, 536 U.S. at 369.
190. Rush Prudential, 536 U.S. at 359.
191. Id.
192. See id. at 360 (noting that Moran's doctor, Dr. Arthur LaMarre, recommended an
unconventional surgery by a nonaffiliated Rush physician, Dr. Julia Terzis).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 361.
195. Id. Section 4-10 of the Act provides:
Each Health Maintenance Organization shall provide a mechanism for the timely
review by a physician holding the same class of license as the primary care
physician, who is unaffiliated with the Health Maintenance Organization, jointly
selected by the patient ... ,primary care physician and the Health Maintenance
Organization in the event of a dispute between the primary care physician and the
Health Maintenance Organization regarding the medical necessity of a covered
service proposed by a primary care physician. In the event that the reviewing
physician determines the covered service to be medically necessary, the Health
Maintenance Organization shall provide the covered service.
215 ILL. COMP. STAT., ch. 125, § 4-10 et seq. (2000).
196. See Rush Prudential, 536 U.S. at 365 (noting that there really was no dispute that
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organizations" that "are almost universally regulated as insurers under state
law," 197 it held that the Illinois HMO Act passed the common-sense analysis. 1
98
The Court then looked at the McCarran-Ferguson factors, but only as
guideposts. 199 Following Ward, the Rush Prudential Court reiterated that each
one of the three McCarran-Ferguson factors did not have to be satisfied for a
state law to fall under the Insurance Savings Clause.200 In doing so, the Court
made it easier for lower courts to find that state laws were saved from ERISA
preemption by the Insurance Savings Clause.
Rush also argued that ERISA preempted the Illinois HMO Act based on
the implied preemption argument originally set forth in Pilot Life.2 °' The
Court, over a strong four-person dissent, 20 2 explained that the Illinois HMO Act
did not provide a new cause of action under state law, nor did it authorize a
new form of relief not set forth in ERISA's civil enforcement provisions.2 3
Therefore, neither express nor implied preemption applied.2 °4
IV. The New Map: Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller
A. The Situation
Despite the Supreme Court's efforts in Ward and Rush Prudential to clear
up Insurance Savings Clause analysis, lower courts continued to struggle with
its application. The two-tiered analysis originally set forth in Metropolitan Life
that considered common sense and the three McCarran-Ferguson factors proved
unworkable. Justice Scalia, speaking for a unanimous Court in Kentucky Ass'n
of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, °5 created a new map to replace the analysis that
courts had followed the previous eighteen years.
ERISA would preempt the Illinois HMO Act because it was an act that "relates to" employee
benefit plans).
197. Id. at 372.
198. See id. at 373 (finding that the Illinois HMO Act was "directed toward" the insurance
industry and was regulating insurance).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See id. at 377 ("Rush says that the day has come to turn dictum into holding by
declaring that the state insurance regulation, § 4-10, is preempted for creating just the kind of
'alternative remedy' we disparaged in Pilot Life.").
202. Id. at 388 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
203. Id. at 375-87.
204. See id. at 387 ("The saving clause is entitled to prevail here.").
205. Ky. Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 123 S. Ct. 1471 (2003).
THE NEW MAP
Miller concerned two Any Willing Provider (AWP) statutes passed by the
Kentucky General Assembly.2°6 The first AWP statute was part of the
Kentucky Health Care Reform Act of 1994.207 This statute prohibited an
insurer from discriminating against any provider that was willing to meet terms
designated by the insurer.2°8 The second AWP statute was passed in 1996 and
was specific to chiropractic benefits. 209  Several Kentucky HMOs had
contracted with a select group of doctors and hospitals to form "exclusive
provider networks."210 The AWP laws infringed on the ability of these HMOs
to continue these exclusive provider networks.211 Kentucky Association of
Health Plans, Inc., a nonprofit organization created to promote the interests of
212its HMO members, and a group of Kentucky HMOs brought suit claiming
that ERISA preempted both AWP statutes. 213 Both the district court214 and the
Sixth Circuit215 determined that the Insurance Savings Clause saved the AWP
statutes from ERISA preemption.2 16 The HMOs appealed to the Supreme
Court.
2 17
206. Id. at 1473-74.
207. Ky. Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Nichols, 227 F.3d 352, 355 (6th Cir. 2000).
208. Miller, 123 S. Ct. at 1473-74. The first AWP statute provides, "A health insurer
shall not discriminate against any provider who is located within the geographic coverage area
of the health benefit plan and who is willing to meet the terms and conditions for participation
established by the health insurer, including the Kentucky state Medicaid program and Medicare
partnerships." KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.17A-270 (Michie 2001 & Supp. 2004).
209. Miller, 123 S. Ct. at 1474. This AWP statute provides, "A health benefit plan that
includes chiropractic benefits shall ... [plermit any licensed chiropractor who agrees to abide
by the terms, conditions, reimbursement rates, and standards of quality of the health benefit plan
to serve as a participating primary chiropractic provider to any person covered by the plan."
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 304.17A-171(2) (Michie 2001 & Supp. 2004). In Kentucky, "health
benefit plan" includes "any hospital... a self-insured plan, or a plan provided by a multiple
employer welfare arrangement, to the extent permitted by ERISA; health maintenance
organization contract; or any health benefit plan that affects the rights of a Kentucky insured and
bears a reasonable relation to Kentucky ...." KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 304.17A-005(18) (Michie
2001 & Supp. 2004).
210. Miller, 123 S. Ct. at 1474.
211. Id.
212. Nichols, 227 F.3d at 355.
213. Miller, 123 S. Ct. at 1474. This group of HMOs brought the suit because they would
not be able to give their customers low-cost healthcare. Low-cost healthcare was possible
through the provider networks because the doctors and hospitals in the networks agreed to offer
their services at discounts in exchange for the HMOs supplying them with an increased number
of patients. Miller, 123 S. Ct. at 1474.
214. Cmty. Health Partners, Inc. v. Nichols, 14 F. Supp. 2d 991 (W.D. Ky. 1998).
215. Nichols, 227 F.3d 352.
216. Id. at 372.
217. On appeal, the HMOs argued that the AWP statutes did not regulate insurance
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B. Original Map Thrown Away
The Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that its opinions in Ward
and Rush Prudential had led to confusion among the lower courts. Justice
Scalia wrote that these decisions, which together held that a state law did not
have to meet each of the three McCarran-Ferguson factors, "raise more
questions than they answer and provide wide opportunities for divergent
outcomes., 21 8 Scalia noted that the Supreme Court had not yet provided
adequate guidance on how courts should implement the McCarran-Ferguson
factors into the Insurance Savings Clause analysis. 219 He asked, "May a state
law satisfy any two of the three McCarran-Ferguson factors and still fall under
the savings clause? Just one? What happens if two of three factors are
satisfied, but not 'securely satisfied' or 'clearly satisfied'... ?,,220 Scalia then
traced the development of the McCarran-Ferguson factors in Insurance Savings
22122Clause jurisprudence.  He explained that in Metropolitan Life,222 the Court
had used the factors merely to help bolster the common-sense analysis.223 Since
Metropolitan Life, the Court had referred to the McCarran-Ferguson factors as
"considerations, 0 24 "checking points, ''22 and "guideposts. '' 226 According to
Scalia, the Court had "never held that the McCarran-Ferguson factors [were] an
essential component of the [Insurance Savings Clause] inquiry."
2 7
because they did not affect risk spreading, change the terms of insurance contracts, or alter the
insurer-insured relationship. Oral Argument of Robert N. Eccles on Behalf of the Petitioners at
6, Ky. Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 123 S. Ct. 1471 (2003) (No. 00-1471). The focus
of the HMOs argument was that the AWP laws only regulated noninsurance relationships. Id. at
26.
218. Miller, 123 S. Ct. at 1478.
219. Id.
220. Id.; see also Rush Prudential, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 373 (2002) ("For in any
event, the second and third factors are clearly satisfied .... "); UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v.
Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 374 (1999) (noting that "the remaining McCarran-Ferguson factors,
verifying the common-sense view, are securely satisfied").
221. Miller, 123 S. Ct. at 1478-79.
222. Supra Part III.A.
223. Miller, 123 S. Ct. at 1479.
224. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 49 (1987).
225. Ward, 526 U.S. at 374.
226. Rush Prudential, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 373 (2002).
227. Miller, 123 S. Ct. at 1479. The attorney for the United States, on behalf of Kentucky,
argued to the Court that the McCarran-Ferguson Act and the Insurance Savings Clause were
worded differently, which was ample reason to "give them a somewhat different scope." Oral
Argument of James A. Feldman on Behalf of the United States, as Amicus Curiae, Supporting
the Respondent at 52, Miller (2003) (No. 00-147 1).
670
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The Supreme Court announced in Miller that the use of the McCarran-
Ferguson factors in the context of ERISA's Insurance Savings Clause had led
only to confusion and had caused courts to lose focus. 228 The factors concerned
what constituted the business of insurance, whereas the Insurance Savings
Clause concerned regulating insurance. 229 The problems that the factors caused
were not counterbalanced by any benefits, for their use had "added little to the
relevant analysis." 230 As a result, the Court decided to "make a clean break"
from the McCarran-Ferguson factors.23 '
C. The Solution
The Miller Court rejected the old analysis and formulated a completely
new framework for courts to use when analyzing whether a state law is saved
by ERISA's Insurance Savings Clause. Once the Court took the McCarran-
Ferguson factors out of the analysis, it was left with only the common-sense
portion of the test. Although not stated explicitly in the opinion, the Court was
not content with the idea of leaving the lower courts with nothing more than a
broad common-sense analysis to determine when the Insurance Savings Clause
was applicable. In oral argument, Justice Scalia expressed his reluctance with
this part of the analysis by pronouncing, "I-I don't trust common sense.
232
He explained that he wanted "some rule of law that-that I can adhere 
to.
233
As a result, when the Court formulated the new test, it set forth two explicit
requirements that a state law had to satisfy to be saved from preemption.2 34 If a
228. Miller, 123 S. Ct. at 1478 ("We believe that our use of the McCarran-Ferguson case
law in the ERISA context has misdirected attention, failed to provide clear guidance to lower
federal courts ... .
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 1479. Scalia also pointed out that there were substantial differences between the
McCarran-Ferguson Act and ERISA's Insurance Savings Clause. For example, the McCarran-
Ferguson Act characterized conduct through private actors, not state laws. Id. at 1478. Also,
the McCarran-Ferguson Act dealt with the "business of insurance" whereas the Insurance
Savings Clause is concerned with whether a state law "regulates insurance." Id. This latter
difference was especially important in Miller because no one argued that the Kentucky law was
part of the "business of insurance." Oral Argument of Robert N. Eccles on Behalf of the
Petitioners at 18, Miller (No. 00-1471).
232. Oral Argument of Elizabeth A. Johnson on Behalf of the Respondent at 41, Miller
(No. 00-1471). Scalia explained, "And I don't like the, you know, common sense test, I know it
when I see it. What I worry about, the-the common sense test is that we will approve those
things that we like, and disapprove those things that we don't like." Id.
233. Id. at 42.
234. Miller, 123 S. Ct. at 1479.
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state law meets these two requirements, the Insurance Savings Clause saves it
from preemption.235 There is no longer any broad, common-sense analysis or
any reference to the McCarran-Ferguson factors.236 The new requirements are
that the state law must: (1) be specifically directed at entities engaged in
insurance and (2) substantially affect the risk-pooling arrangement between the
insurer and insured.237
The HMOs in Miller argued that the AWP statutes were not specifically
directed at insurers because in addition to regulating the insurance industry, the
statutes regulated doctors seeking to participate in provider networks.238 The
Court, however, focused on the wording of the statutes and explained that both
AWP statutes were directed at health insurers or benefit plans.239 Even though
the laws may have affected entities outside the insurance industry such as
health-care providers, the statutes were not specifically directed at those
entities. 24 Therefore, the AWP statutes met the first requirement of the
Supreme Court's new test.
The HMOs also contended that ERISA should preempt the AWP statutes
because they focus on the relationship between insurers and third-party
providers, not the terms of an actual insurance policy.2 4' This argument,
however, was based on a case involving the McCarran-Ferguson Act in which
the Supreme Court had held that the relationship between insurers and third
parties (pharmacies) did not constitute the "business of insurance. ''242 The
Court rejected this argument because ERISA's Insurance Savings Clause does
not require the state law to pertain to the "business of insurance"; the Savings
Clause only requires that a state law "regulate insurance., 243 The AWP laws
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. It is important to note that Miller did not alter the concept of implied preemption.
If a state statute provides for remedies outside the scope of ERISA's civil enforcement
provisions, then ERISA will still preempt it. See supra notes 96-109 and accompanying text
(explaining implied preemption).
238. Miller, 123 S. Ct. at 1475.
239. Id. at 1475-76.
240. Id. "Regulations 'directed toward' certain entities will almost always disable other
entities from doing, with the regulated entities, what the regulations forbid; this does not suffice
to place such regulation outside the scope of ERISA's savings clause." Id. at 1476.
241. Id.
242. See id. (stating that the petitioners rely on Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug
Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979), to support their second argument).
243. Id. at 1477.
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regulated insurance by imposing conditions on insurers that prevented them
from discriminating against any willing provider. 2"
The Court explained that the conditions that were imposed on the right to
engage in the insurance business must substantially affect the risk-pooling
arrangement. 245  The requirement that a state law affect the risk-pooling
arrangement was necessary or any state law having to do with insurance would
fall under the Savings Clause, which was supposed to save only those laws that
specifically "regulate insurance." 246 The Court rejected the HMOs' argument
that in order to satisfy the risk-pooling requirement, a law had to alter or affect
the terms of the insurance policies.247 The AWP statutes substantially affected
the risk-pooling arrangement between insurers and the insured and, therefore,
met the second requirement of the new test.248 For support, the Court explained
that the AWP statutes impacted the risk-pooling arrangement similarly to the
Metropolitan Life mandated-benefit law, the Ward notice-prejudice rule, and
the Rush Prudential independent-review provision.249
V. Following the Map
A. The New Map Is Stronger
The discovery of a new and arguably better map should increase your
chances of finding a way out of the cave, but success is not guaranteed. The
only way the map will help is if it can be understood as it was intended;
otherwise, it will be meaningless. Similarly, the Supreme Court's new map in
Miller should help alleviate the lower courts' confusion about the Insurance
Savings Clause analysis. This, however, will only occur if the lower courts
interpret the new map in the way that the Supreme Court intended. The new
244. Id.
245. Id. Note that the Court announced the new test in the last paragraph of the opinion
after it had established that the Kentucky laws were specifically directed at insurance entities
and that they substantially affected the risk-pooling arrangement. See id. at 1479 (announcing
the new test).
246. See id. (noting, for illustration, that if substantially affecting the risk-pooling
arrangement was not required, then laws requiring insurance companies to pay their janitors
twice the minimum wage fall under the Insurance Savings Clause).
247. Id.
248. Id. at 1478. But see Russell Korobkin, The Failed Jurisprudence of Managed Care,
and How to Fix It: Reinterpreting ER1SA Preemption, 51 UCLA L. REv. 457, 533 (2003)
(suggesting that the Kentucky AWP laws did not meet substantially affect the risk-pooling
arrangement between the insurer and the insured).
249. Miller, 123 S. Ct. at 1477-78.
62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 643 (2005)
test set forth in Miller is simple and to the point.250 The Supreme Court's
message to lower courts was clear: If a state statute meets both prongs of the
new test, then the Insurance Savings Clause saves the statute from express
preemption. 1
In order for lower courts to correctly interpret the new map, they must
realize that this map is different from the old one. Under Miller's first prong, a
state statute must be "specifically," not exclusively, directed at entities engaged
in insurance.252 In the old test that considered the McCarran-Ferguson factors,
one of the factors that went into the analysis asked whether the law was
"limited" to entities within the insurance industry.253 For example, a law could
be directed toward the insurance industry, but the law could also have effects in
other industries. This kind of law would not meet the old test, which required
the law to be "limited" to entities within the insurance industry; however, it
would meet the first prong of Miller. In determining whether the AWP statutes
considered in Miller were specifically directed toward entities engaged in
insurance, Scalia suggested that this prong could be met without the statute
necessarily constituting the business of insurance.25 4 For example, laws
requiring attorneys to take continuing legal education classes are specifically
directed toward entities engaged in the legal profession (lawyers); however,
taking continuing legal education classes is not the "business" of law.
255
The more obvious difference in the new map and the old one, however,
involves Miller's second prong, which requires the state law to substantially
affect the risk-pooling arrangement between the insurer and the insured.25 6 The
Miller Court explicitly stated that this prong is different than the McCarran-
Ferguson factor that required a state statute to spread risk.25 7 Scalia explained
that the state statute only has to substantially affect the risk-pooling
arrangement and does not have to alter or control the actual insurance policy.
258
By not having to alter or control the terms of the actual policy, the Insurance
250. Id. at 1479 (setting forth only two prongs in the test).
251. Id. ("[Flor a state law to be deemed a 'law... which regulates insurance' under
§ 1144(b)(2)(A), it must satisfy two requirements.").
252. See supra note 229 and accompanying text (outlining the Miller test).
253. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (describing the three factors borrowed from
the McCarran-Ferguson Act).
254. Miller, 123 S. Ct. at 1477.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 1479.
257. Id. at 1477 n.3.
258. Id.
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Savings Clause should be applicable to a wider variety of statutes than it
previously had been after cases such as Pilot Life.259
Most lower courts have understood that the map set forth in Miller not
only "substantially clarified, ' '260 but also "dramatically changed ''26' the old
analysis. 262 Some courts, however, are clinging to pre-Miller principles and
have not yet recognized that the Miller map replaced the old one provided in
Metropolitan Life. For example, the Fourth Circuit has noted that Miller "did
not work any fundamental change" in the Insurance Savings Clause analysis.
263
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has stated that the Miller prongs are merely
"remnants" of the original test from Metropolitan Life.264 Although in a loose
sense the new test's prongs could be considered "remnants" of the old test, this
phrasing does not address the key fact that the new test bolsters the Insurance
Savings Clause.
The lower courts must recognize the Miller map as a new test and
understand that it is an improvement on the old map. It is an improvement
because Miller simplified the analysis and made the Insurance Savings Clause
265stronger. The old analysis considered common sense and three factors that
were relevant, but not required.2 66 The new analysis replaces this confusing
inquiry with two distinct factors.2 67 If those two factors are met, the Insurance
259. See Elliot v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., 337 F.3d 1138, 1145(9thCir. 2003) (explaining
that risk spreading can potentially "be found in a much wider variety of statutes than Pilot Life
suggested").
260. Kidneigh v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 345 F.3d 1182, 1186 (10th Cir. 2003); see
also Morales-Ceballos v. First UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 03-CV-925, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9801, at *7 (E.D. Pa. 2003) ("By reducing the multi-factored test to a two-prong
analysis, Miller clarified the factors that federal courts should consider in determining whether
ERISA preemption is warranted.").
261. Rosenbaum v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 01-6758, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15652, at *2 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
262. See Bonnell v. Bank of Am., 284 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1287 (D. Kan. 2003) (explaining
that Miller set forth a "new two-part test"); Rosenbaum, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15652, at *3
(asserting that Miller "significantly altered the applicable test for determining whether state
legislation qualifies for protection" by the Insurance Savings Clause); Hollaway v. UNUM Life
Ins. Co. of Am., 2003 OK 90, at *16-17 (Okla. 2003) (contending that the Supreme Court had
created a new test that specifically rejected a test that had previously been followed).
263. Singh v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 335 F.3d 278, 286 (4th Cir. 2003).
264. See Elliot, 337 F.3d at 1143 (suggesting that this is "immediately apparent").
265. See supra note 251 and accompanying text (explaining that Miller simplified the
analysis).
266. See supra notes 54-69 and accompanying text (describing the original map set forth
in Metropolitan Life).
267. See supra note 229 and accompanying text (outlining the two factors in the new
Miller test).
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Savings Clause is applicable. Under the new map, it should be easier for a state
268law to be "saved" from preemption.
B. Interpreting the Map
Just as you will remain lost in the cave if you are unable to read your map,
lower courts will remain lost in the confusion of the Insurance Savings Clause
if they do not interpret the Miller map correctly. Some lower courts are
unwilling to interpret Miller in the way it was intended. The case most
illustrative of this problem is Kidneigh v. UNUM Life Insurance Co. of
America, 269 which was decided in October 2003. In Kidneigh, UNUM Life
Insurance Co. (UNUM) was administrator of an employee disability plan for
the law firm of Kidneigh & Kaufman, P.C. 270 An employee of the firm, Jon
Kidneigh, filed a claim for disability benefits with UNUM following multiple
back and hernia surgeries. 271 Although UNUM paid these benefits initially, it
cut them off on March 31, 1999, after deciding that Kidneigh was able to return
272to work. Kidneigh brought suit under ERISA, but also brought a bad faith
claim under Colorado state law. 273 UNUM argued that ERISA preempted the
bad faith claim, but Kidneigh asserted that the Insurance Savings Clause
274applied to save it from preemption.
The Tenth Circuit analyzed the bad faith claim and determined that the
state statute authorizing this claim was expressly preempted because it did not
meet the Miller test.275 The court ruled that the Colorado law was not
268. See supra notes 249-50 and accompanying text (explaining that the Insurance Savings
Clause potentially can now apply to save more laws than pre-Miller).
269. Kidneigh v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 345 F.3d 1182 (10th Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 1133 (Feb. 23, 2004). In Kidneigh, the Tenth Circuit had to decide
whether ERISA preempted a Colorado bad faith law. Id. at 1183-84. An employee sued his
employer's insurance provider for stopping disability payments. Id. at 1183. The court found
that ERISA preempted the claim and that the Insurance Savings Clause did not save it from
preemption. Id. at 1185-86. Although the court held that the Colorado law was impliedly
preempted because it provided additional remedies outside of ERISA's civil enforcement
scheme, the court went on to assert that the law was also expressly preempted under the Miller
test. Id. at 1185-88. Above a strong dissent, the court decided that the Colorado law was not
specifically directed toward entities engaged in insurance, nor did it substantially affect the risk-
pooling arrangement between the insurer-insured. Id. at 1189.
270. Id. at 1183.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. Kidneigh's wife also brought a loss of consortium claim under Colorado law. Id.
274. Id. at 1184-85.
275. Id. at 1189.
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specifically directed toward entities engaged in insurance and that it did not
substantially affect the risk-pooling arrangement of the insurer-insured.276 In
conducting the express preemption analysis, the majority failed to follow the
Supreme Court's lead-had it done so, the express preemption analysis would
have led to a different conclusion.277 The court already had stated that implied
preemption applied because the Colorado law provided remedies beyond the
scope of ERISA's civil enforcement provisions. 278 Because the court already
had decided that implied preemption applied, there was no reason to consider
whether the Colorado law was saved from express preemption.279 Although
unnecessary, the court's express preemption analysis is relevant to Insurance
Savings Clause jurisprudence because it provides a clear example of a lower
court not following the new map in the way the Supreme Court intended. 280 To
explain this contention, the court's analysis of each prong of the Miller test will
be considered separately.
1. The First Prong
The Kidneigh court merely glossed over the first prong of Miller in its
analysis concerning whether the Colorado state law that authorized the bad
faith cause of action was specifically directed at entities engaged in
insurance.281 The majority noted that Colorado courts have not exclusively
28confined bad faith causes of action to insurance entities. 82 For example, bad
faith causes of action have been applied to many noninsurance areas283 and to
all contracts in general under an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.284
276. Id.
277. See infra notes 272-334 and accompanying text (asserting that the majority's analysis
of each Miller prong was incorrect).
278. Kidneigh, 345 F.3dat 1185.
279. See id. at 1189 (Henry, J., dissenting) (explaining that the majority's direct
preemption analysis was unnecessary to its holding).
280. See id. (Henry, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority's conclusion after conducting
its unnecessary express preemption analysis was problematic).
281. See id. at 1185-86 (noting that the Colorado law was expressly preempted, but then
going on to analyze the second Miller factor before thoroughly explaining the first).
282. Id. at 1186.
283. See Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co., 29 P.3d 887,908 (Colo. 2001) (finding that the
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing has developed through implied covenants and is
applicable to oil and gas leases).
284. See Amoco Oil Co. v. Ervin, 908 P.2d 493, 498 (Colo. 1995) (explaining that in
Colorado, like most other jurisdictions, all contracts contain an implied duty of good faith and
fair dealing).
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The majority went on to say that even if bad faith claims had been limited to the
insurance setting, ERISA preemption would still apply.285 For this proposition,
the majority cited Pilot Life.286 The majority explained that Pilot Life was cited
with approval in Miller and that it had not been overruled. 287 It also noted that
although "the test for analyzing ERISA preemption cases has evolved," the pre-
Miller holdings concerning preemption of bad faith claims were still valid.288
The majority's decision to place great stock in Pilot Life is problematic because
later cases such as UNUM Life Insurance Co. of America v. Ward289 undercut
Pilot Life's reasoning.29°
The first Pilot Life principle that Ward questioned was the exact principle
that Kidneigh relied on in determining whether the Colorado law met the first
Miller prong. Pilot Life stated that bad faith laws were not specifically directed
at insurance if bad faith claims could be made in noninsurance settings.
291
"[Ward] took a much more generous approach than did Pilot Life in analyzing
whether a law was specifically directed at insurance."292 Ward focused on the
fact that California's notice-prejudice rule was directed at insurance by its very
terms and that it contained provisions applicable only to insurance
companies.293 The fact that similar claims could be made in other areas was
irrelevant, which was a substantive change from Pilot Life.294 Therefore, the
Kidneigh majority's reliance on Pilot Life to find that bad faith causes of action
were not specifically directed at entities engaged in insurance if they also could
be made in noninsurance settings was problematic.
285. See Kidneigh, 345 F.3d at 1186 ("Even if the Colorado state courts had limited bad
faith claims to the insurance context, however, that fact alone would not save Colorado bad faith
claims from ERISA preemption.").
286. Id.
287. Id. at 1188 ("Had the Supreme Court intended Miller to overrule Pilot Life or, in the
Kidneigh's words, eviscerate its precedential value, the Court could have said as much; the fact
that Pilot Life is still cited in Miller with approval suggests otherwise.").
288. Id.
289. Supra Part III.D. 1.
290. See Elliot v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., 337 F.3d 1138, 1144 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that
Ward is the principal case challenging some of Pilot Life's conclusions).
291. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 50 (1987). The other Pilot Life principles
that Ward questioned are also important and will be discussed in a later section. Infra Part
V.B.2.
292. Elliot, 337 F.3d at 1145. The Kidneigh majority calls Elliot's discussion of the
evolution of ERISA preemption "interesting." Kidneigh, 345 F.3d at 1189.
293. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 368-73 (1999).
294. See Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 50 (finding that the Mississippi common law of bad faith
could be applicable to other areas outside of insurance, even though the Mississippi Supreme
Court had identified the law with the insurance industry).
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In analyzing the first Miller prong, the Kidneigh majority failed to
distinguish between Colorado's two different bad faith causes of action, one
that arises in contract and the other in tort.295 The contract bad faith claim is
inherent in all contracts because of the implied duty of good faith and fair
dealing. 296 The tort bad faith claim, however, is unique to a surety-insured
relationship.297 The dissent explained that the Colorado bad faith claim at issue
in Kidneigh was for the breach of an insurance contract and thus was derived in
tort.298 Therefore, it "'exist[s] independently of the liability imposed by an
insurance contract. ' ', 299  This is important because Colorado courts have
analyzed insurance bad faith claims differently from other general bad faith
claims.300 They have adopted specific policy considerations and a separate set
of laws to govern insurance bad faith claims. 30 1 The dissent asserted that
Colorado courts have not extended these same considerations to contexts
beyond insurance.30 2 However, even if these considerations did have effects on
areas outside of the insurance context, as long as the effects were de minimis,
the law still should be saved from preemption. 30 3 Had the majority understood
that for a law to be specifically directed at entities engaged in insurance it did
not have to be limited exclusively to the insurance industry, it would have
found that the statutory Colorado bad faith cause of action met the first prong of
the test.
3 °4
295. See Kidneigh v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 345 F.3d 1182, 1193 (10th Cir. 2003)
(Henry, J., dissenting) (asserting that the majority "erroneously conflate[d] two separate causes
of action ... [that] are quite distinct under well-settled Colorado law").
296. Id. (Henry, J., dissenting).
297. Id. (Henry, J., dissenting).
298. Id. (Henry, J., dissenting).
299. Id. (Henry, J., dissenting) (quoting Pham v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 70 P.3d
567, 571 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003)).
300. Id. at 1194 (Henry, J., dissenting).
301. See id. at 1194-95 (Henry, J., dissenting) (explaining that the motivations of an
insured entering into insurance contracts is different than that of a party entering a basic
commercial contract). The dissent also conducts a thorough overview of the laws in this area in
the last twenty years and explains how the state legislature has amended them. Id. at 1194-95
(Henry, J., dissenting).
302. Id. at 1195 (Henry, J., dissenting).
303. Id. (Henry, J., dissenting); see also Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S.
355, 373-74 (2002) (explaining that although the Illinois independent review laws may affect
contexts other than insurance, this would not be enough to prevent the law from being saved).
304. See Kidneigh, 345 F.3d at 1196 (Henry, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is clear that Colorado's
insurance bad faith law is 'specifically directed toward entities engaged in insurance."' (quoting
Miller, 123 S. Ct. 1471, 1479 (2003))).
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2. The Second Prong
Kidneigh also found that the Colorado bad faith claim failed to meet the
second Miller prong.3°5 The second Miller prong requires a state statute to
substantially affect the risk-pooling arrangement between the insurer and the
insured.3°6 The Kidneigh majority asserted that Pilot Life and "other" ERISA
preemption cases demonstrate that state bad faith claims cannot substantially
affect the risk-pooling arrangement. 30 7  It cited a passage from Pilot Life
explaining that a bad faith claim does not define the terms of the insurer-
insured relationship. 30 8 The majority also announced that it was following the
holding of another Tenth Circuit case that held that ERISA preempted a
Colorado bad faith claim on the grounds that it was substantively similar to the
Mississippi bad faith claim in Pilot Life.309 Although the Kidneighs argued
correctly that the precedential weight of the holdings of Pilot Life and other
pre-Ward Tenth Circuit cases had been diminished by Ward and Miller, the
310majority did not agree.
The Kidneigh majority was correct in asserting that Pilot Life had held that
claims processing laws did not substantially affect risk-pooling arrangements.3 '
This point, however, was another Pilot Life principle that was challenged by
later Supreme Court jurisprudence.31 2 In Ward, the Supreme Court found that
because the notice-prejudice rule occasionally shifted the "risk of late notice
305. Id. at 1186.
306. Ky. Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 123 S. Ct. 1471, 1479 (2003).
307. Kidneigh, 345 F.3d at 1186. Other lower courts agree with the Kidneigh majority that
the risk-pooling arrangement is not substantially affected by bad faith claims. See Hollaway v.
UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 2003 OK 90, at *25 (Okla. 2003) (finding that Oklahoma's cause
of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing did not substantially
affect the risk-pooling arrangement).
308. Kidneigh, 345 F.3d at 1186; see also Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51
(1987) (contrasting the Mississippi bad faith common law with the mandated-benefits law from
Metropolitan Life).
309. Kidneigh, 345 F.3d at 1187-88. The court referred to Kelley v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 882 F.2d 453, 456 (10th Cir. 1989). Kelley held Colorado's law of bad faith did not
regulate insurance because it does not spread or transfer policyholder risk, it does not control
the substance of the insurer-insured relationship, it developed from the general principles of tort
and contract law, and it conflicts with ERISA's civil enforcement provisions. Kelley, 882 F.2d
at 456.
310. See Kidneigh, 345 F.3d at 1188 ("The Kidneighs fail to overcome Kelley's
precedential value in this case.").
311. See Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 50 ("[The] common law of bad faith does not affect a
spreading of policyholder risk.").
312. See supra notes 277-81 and accompanying text (explaining that later cases have
undercut some of Pilot Life's principles).
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and stale evidence from the insured" to the insurer, risk was spread among
policyholders because it led to higher premiums.313 Miller noted that the
notice-prejudice rule considered in Ward would meet the new test's second
prong. 314 Both Ward and Miller suggest that the Supreme Court's new test
contains "potentially broader concepts of risk-pooling," which would make the
Insurance Savings Clause apply to more state statutes.315
As the Kidneigh dissent explained, Pilot Life' s "precedential value on the
precise issue of the 'substantially affect' prong has been seriously eroded, if not
eviscerated, by Miller. " 316 Pilot Life focused on the McCarran-Ferguson factor
that required a state statute to have an effect of spreading policyholder risk; and
thus, the Court held that the Mississippi common law of bad faith did not
spread risk.317 Miller, however, specifically rejected the use of the McCarran-
Ferguson factors. 8 As stated above, Miller explicitly stated that the new test's
second prong was different than the McCarran-Ferguson factor that required a
statute to spread risk:319 "[O]ur test requires only that the state law substantially
affect the risk-pooling arrangement between the insurer and insured; it does not
require that the state law actually spread risk. 3 20 Scalia's use of the word
"only" suggests that the new test is easier to meet than the old one and follows
313. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 374 (1999).
314. See Ky. Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 123 S. Ct. 1471, 1477 n.3 (2003)
(discussing the risk allocation requirement) The Court stated:
The notice prejudice rule governs whether or not an insurance company must cover
claims submitted late, which dictates to the insurance company the conditions
under which it must pay the risk that it has assumed. This certainly qualifies as a
substantial effect on the risk-pooling arrangement between the insurer and insured.
Id.
315. Elliot v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., 337 F.3d 1138, 1145 (9th Cir. 2003). In Elliot, the
Ninth Circuit had to determine whether an employee's claim for disability benefits under non-
ERISA state statutes seeking compensatory and punitive damages was preempted. Id. at 1140.
Although the court explained that the Montana Unfair Trade Practices Act might substantially
affect risk-pooling, it did not have to reach that question because the court found the claim
preempted based on an implied preemption theory. Id. at 1145-46. The Unfair Trade Practices
Act might have substantially affected risk-pooling because it obligates insurers to make
payments before the policy triggers a duty to indemnify and it requires insurers to pay any
excess judgments for their insureds in the case of a violation. Id. at 1145.
316. Kidneigh v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 345 F.3d 1182, 1196 (10th Cir. 2003)
(Henry, J., dissenting).
317. See supra Part flI.B (explaining Pilot Life).
318. See supra Part IV.B (rejecting explicitly the use of the McCarran-Ferguson factors in
composing a new map).
319. Ky. Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 123 S. Ct. 1471, 1477 n.3 (2003).
320. Id.
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the Supreme Court's trend to curtail ERISA preemption. 321 The Colorado law
under consideration in Kidneigh required that insurers make an attempt to settle
when liability was reasonably clear and forbade them from offering anything
322less than a reasonable amount. The risk of nonperformance in settlement was
with the insurer under the statute; as the dissent stated, the "statute thus changes
the conditions under which an insurer will 'pay for the risk it has assumed. ,
323
Because the law gave the insureds protection in settlement negotiations that
they did not previously possess, it substantially affected the risk-pooling
arrangement.3 24
It is not surprising that a lower court could misapply Miller's second
prong. One commentator has noted, "In short, Miller's second requirement is
in equal parts elastic and opaque, and provides little principled guidance to the
lower courts. 3 25  This commentator suggests that more litigation will be
necessary to determine whether state statutes have to affect premium
calculations, impose obligations on insurers, or prohibit certain practices in
order to substantially affect the risk-pooling arrangement.
326
As long as courts understand that the new test's second prong is different
than the McCarran-Ferguson factor dealing with the spreading of risk, then
courts should be able to apply the Miller test consistently. Kidneigh, however,
is not the only court that has muddled this analysis. Within two months of
Miller, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania decided
two cases under an analysis similar to Kidneigh. In McGuigan v. Reliance
Standard Life Insurance Co. 327 and Morales-Ceballos v. First UNUM Life
321. See Kidneigh, 345 F.3d at 1197 (Henry, J., dissenting) (explaining that Miller, like
Ward and Rush, concluded that the risk analysis did not result in ERISA preemption). For a
discussion of Ward, see supra Part III.D.1; for a discussion of Rush, see supra Part III.D.2.
322. Kidneigh, 345 F.3d at 1198 (Henry, J., dissenting).
323. Id. (Henry, J., dissenting).
324. Id. at 1199 (Henry, J., dissenting).
325. Jason S. Mazer, Features: Pilot Life Pushed ERISA 's Preemption Pendulum to the
Top of Its Arc, But Didn't Suspend the Law of Gravity, 78 FLA. BARJ. 10, 14 (2004), available
at http://web2.infotrac-custom.com/pdfserve/get item/1/S366lffw7_l/SB7 11_01 .pdf; see also
Nguyen v. Healthguard of Lancaster, Inc., 282 F. Supp. 2d 296, 305 (E.D. Pa. 2003) ("Miller
does not provide much guidance in construing the meaning of the test that it announces.").
326. Mazer, supra note 325, at 14. Mazer also asks, "how substantially must the risk
pooling arrangement be affected?" Id.
327. McGuigan v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 345 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
In McGuigan, decided only seven days after Miller was announced, the court had to determine
whether ERISA preempted Pennsylvania's bad faith statute. Id. at 346. Francis McGuigan filed
a bad faith claim against Reliance because of its refusal to pay him long-term disability benefits
pursuant to an employee benefit plan it had with McGuigan's employer, Heraeus Electro-Nite.
Id. The court conducted the two-part Miller test and found the first prong satisfied. Id. at 347-
48. In reviewing the second prong, the court found that it was not met. Id. at 348. The court
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Insurance Co. of America,328 the court held that Pennsylvania's bad faith
statute 329 did not substantially affect the risk-pooling arrangement between the
insurer and the insured. 330 In Morales-Ceballos, the court based its conclusion--r 331
entirely on Pilot Life, which is the same mistake that the Kidneigh court
made.332 Likewise, in McGuigan, the court based its conclusion on a case333
that was decided using the McCarran-Ferguson factors, not the new Miller
test.
3 34
The Pennsylvania district court, however, later realized that this analysis
was incorrect and changed course in Rosenbaum v. UNUM Life Insurance Co.
ofAmerica.335 Rosenbaum did not make the same mistake that McGuigan and
Morales-Ceballos did by requiring the state statute to spread risk in order to
noted that the second prong was absent because of the same reasons in Pilot Life. Id. Pilot Life,
however, applied the test set forth in Metropolitan Life that included the McCarran-Ferguson
factors; McGuigan was applying a test in which the McCarran-Ferguson factors had been
extracted. See Rosenbaum v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 01-6758, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15652, at *14-15 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (explaining the test as applied in both cases).
328. Morales-Ceballos v. First UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 03-CV-925, 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 9801 (E.D. Pa. 2003). In Morales-Ceballos, the court considered whether ERISA
preempted Pennsylvania's bad faith statute. Id. at *1-2. The case involved a claim by Diego
Morales-Ceballos seeking punitive damages from his employer's insurer under the state's bad
faith law. Id. at *1. In applying Miller to determine whether the Insurance Savings Clause
saved the law from preemption, the court found that the test's second prong was not met. Id. at
*8. For support, the court focused on the discussion of risk spreading in Tutelo v. Independence
Blue Cross Instructive, No. 98-CV-5928, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6335, at *7 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
Because Tutelo said that the bad faith law did not spread risk, Morales-Ceballos said it followed
that the bad faith law did not substantially affect the risk-pooling arrangement between the
insurer and the insured. Morales-Ceballos, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9801, at *8.
329. The Pennsylvania bad faith statute provides: "In an action arising under an insurance
policy, if the court finds that the insurer has acted in bad faith toward the insured, the court
may" offer any of the following remedies: "(1) Award interest on the amount of the claim from
the date the claim was made by the insured in an amount equal to the prime rate of interest plus
3%; (2) Award punitive damages against the insurer; (3) Assess court costs and attorney fees
against the insurer." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8371 (2003).
330. McGuigan, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 348; Morales-Ceballos, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9801,
at *8.
331. For a discussion of Pilot Life, see supra Part IILB-C.
332. See supra notes 277-81 and accompanying text (explaining that later cases have
undercut some of Pilot Life's principles).
333. Tutelo, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6335.
334. See Rosenbaum v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 01-6758, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15652, at *14 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
335. Id. In Rosenbaum, the court again had to consider whether ERISA preempted the
Pennsylvania bad faith statute. Id. at *1. Joel Rosenbaum initially brought suit against UNUM
for bad faith in handling his long-term disability claim. Id. The court found that the
Pennsylvania law met both Miller prongs and would be saved from ERISA preemption. Id. at
*10-18. The court also notes that the law is not subject to implied preemption. Id. at *18-26.
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satisfy Miller.33 6 "While both [McGuigan and Morales-Ceballos] correctly recite
the second prong of the Miller test, neither actually applies the standard as presented
by Miller.'3 37 Instead, both of these cases relied on the risk-spreading requirement
from the McCarran-Ferguson factors, which was distinguished from Miller's second
prong by the Miller Court.3 38 Had McGuigan and Morales-Ceballos looked at
whether the state statute substantially affected the risk-pooling arrangement and not
whether it resulted in the spreading of risk, then the Pennsylvania law would have
met the second Miller factor.339 By creating disincentives for the insurer to deny
claims in bad faith, the Pennsylvania law altered the risk-pooling arrangement, for
the insured's risk that the insurer will deny a claim in bad faith was inherent in any
insurer-insured risk-pooling arrangement. 340 Also, like the Colorado law at issue in
Kidneigh,34' the Pennsylvania law gave insureds greater protection in settlement
discussions because it gave insurers more incentive to settle rather than risk a costly
verdict at trial.342 The Pennsylvania law also prevented insurers from deflecting the
risk in the insured's policy by nullifying any risk-deflection provisions that the
insurer creates.34 3 Both the Colorado and Pennsylvania bad faith laws substantially
affected the risk-pooling arrangement and met the second Miller prong.
V. Conclusion
Courts have struggled with the Insurance Savings Clause's role in ERISA
preemption since Congress passed ERISA in 1974.34' Eleven years later in
336. Id. at *13.
337. Id. at"15.
338. See supra notes 248-50 and accompanying text ("[The new test] requires only that the
state law substantially affect the risk pooling arrangement between the insurer and the insured; it
does not require that the state law actually spread risk.").
339. See Rosenbaum, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15652, at *17 ("Just as California's notice-
prejudice rule [in Ward] substantially affects the allocation of risk between an insurer and an
insured by limiting an insurer's ability to deflect risk, [the Pennsylvania bad faith law] does the
same.").
340. Id.
341. See supra notes 260-71 and accompanying text (describing the Colorado law at issue
in Kidneigh).
342. See Rosenbaum, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15652, at *17 (explaining that the
Pennsylvania law "shows a significant shift of risk from the insured to the insurer").
343. Id. at* "18.
344. Even though the Colorado bad faith law should have met the second Miller prong, the
Kidneigh majority decided that it did not. See supra notes 260-71 and accompanying text
(explaining the majority's analysis).
345. See supra note 40 (explaining the problems that courts faced in the years immediately
following ERISA's enactment).
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Metropolitan Life, the Supreme Court set forth a map for lower courts to use to
determine whether the Insurance Savings Clause should apply to save a state statute
from ERISA preemption.346 The original map explained to lower courts that they
first must employ their common sense and ask if the state law regulated
insurance.347 They then had to apply three factors borrowed from the McCarran-
Ferguson Act:348 (1) whether the policy has the effect of transferring or spreading
the policyholder's risk; (2) whether the practice is an integral part of the policy
relationship between the insurer and the insured; and (3) whether the practice is
limited to entities within the insurance industry.349
After the Supreme Court set forth the original map, it had to adapt it as new
situations surfaced.35 ° In 1987, Pilot Life limited the scope of the Insurance Savings
Clause and also introduced the concept of implied preemption.351 Lower courts
continued to have problems applying the original map, which led the Supreme
Court to attempt to clarify the map in Ward352 and Rush Prudential.35 3 These
attempts, however, did not cure the confusion. In 2003, the Supreme Court decided
to throw out the old map and create a completely different one.354 In Miller, the
Court drafted the new map.355 For the Insurance Savings Clause to save a state
statute from preemption under the new analysis, the statute has to meet two prongs:
First, it has to be specifically directed at entities engaged in insurance and second, it
must substantially affect the risk-pooling arrangement between the insurer and the
insured.
356
The new map announced in Miller represents a significant change from the old
map first introduced in Metropolitan Life.357 The new map is simpler and makes it
346. See supra Part IH.A (examining Metropolitan Life).
347. See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text (describing the first step of the
Metropolitan Life analysis).
348. See supra notes 56-68 and accompanying text (describing the second step of the
Metropolitan Life analysis).
349. Supra note 59 and accompanying text.
350. See supra Part II.B-D (tracing the development of the original map from 1985-
2003).
351. See supra Part ImI.B-C (discussing Pilot Life).
352. See supra Part III.D.1 (discussing Ward).
353. See supra Part III.D.2 (discussing Rush Prudential).
354. See supra Part IV (explaining the Supreme Court's effort to clear up the confusion
involved in the Insurance Savings Clause analysis).
355. See supra note 229 and accompanying text (outlining the new test).
356. Supra note 229 and accompanying text.
357. See supra notes 244-55 and accompanying text (explaining how the Miller test is
different from the old test).
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easier for a state law to be saved by the Insurance Savings Clause.358 Lower courts
such as Kidneigh that have not recognized Miller as a different test have failed to
interpret the map as the Supreme Court intended.359 These courts continue to apply
reasoning that the Supreme Court set forth in Pilot Life, even though this reasoning
has been criticized by more recent Supreme Court cases. 3 ° If lower courts
acknowledge that Miller is a new map and that it completes a trend by the Supreme
Court to make it easier for the Insurance Savings Clause to apply, the rampant
confusion that has existed in Insurance Savings Clause analysis for the past thirty
years will be cured.36 ' If they do not, however, then just as you may never surface
from your spelunking expedition, the courts may remain lost indefinitely.
362
358. See supra notes 256-59 and accompanying text (asserting that the Insurance Savings
Clause will save more statutes under the Miller test than it had pre-Miller).
359. See supra Part V.B (discussing Kidneigh).
360. See supra notes 277-81 and accompanying text (explaining that some of Pilot Life's
principles have been undercut by more recent cases).
361. See supra Part V (explaining how lower courts should interpret the Miller map).
362. See supra Part I (comparing the history of Insurance Savings Clause analysis with
being lost in a cave).
